Sovereignty in cyberspace: organised hypocrisy? by Adamson, Liisi
UNIVERSITY OF TARTU 
SCHOOL OF LAW 
Department of public law 
 
 
 
 
 
Liisi Adamson 
SOVEREIGNTY IN CYBERSPACE: ORGANISED HYPOCRISY? 
Master’s Thesis 
 
 
Supervisor 
Prof. Lauri Mälksoo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tartu 
2016 
  
 2 
Table of Contents 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................ 3 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 4 
1. THE VOCABULARY OF CYBERSECURITY ........................................................................ 11 
2. SOVEREIGNTY AS A CONCEPT ............................................................................................ 16 
2.1. SOVEREIGNTY AS A CORNERSTONE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ................................................ 16 
2.2. IS SOVEREIGNTY WITHERING AWAY? ...................................................................................... 21 
3. SOVEREIGNTY IN CYBERSPACE – A NECESSARY OXYMORON ............................... 24 
3.1. CYBER LIBERTARIANISM: CYBERSPACE AS A LAW-FREE ZONE .............................................. 25 
3.2. COMMON MISCONCEPTION: CYBERSPACE AS A GLOBAL COMMONS ....................................... 27 
3.3. CYBERSPACE AND TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY ...................................................................... 31 
4. EXERCISING SOVEREIGNTY IN CYBERSPACE ............................................................... 36 
4.1. INTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY ......................................................................................................... 37 
4.2. INTERNATIONAL NORMS DEVELOPMENT IN THE FIELD OF CYBERSECURITY ........................... 42 
4.2.1. United Nations Group of Governmental Experts ............................................................. 43 
4.2.2. The quest for a new treaty? .............................................................................................. 46 
4.3. FROM THE BREACH OF SOVEREIGNTY TO INTERVENTION: AN ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY ......... 49 
5. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CYBERSPACE JUXTAPOSED .......................................... 58 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................... 64 
SUVERÄÄNSUS KÜBERRUUMIS: ORGANISEERITUD SILMAKIRJALIKKUS? ................ 67 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................................ 72 
NORMATIVE SOURCES ................................................................................................................... 83 
CASE LAW ........................................................................................................................................... 85 
UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS .................................................................................................. 86 
OTHER SOURCES .............................................................................................................................. 87 
 
  
 3 
List of abbreviations 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
CNA Computer Network Attack 
CNE Computer Network Exploitation 
CUP Cambridge University Press 
DDoS Distributed Denial-of-Service Attack 
DoD Department of Defence 
DoS Denial of Service Attack 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
ICJ Statute Statute of the International Court of Justice 
ICT Information and communication technology 
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 
ILC International Law Commission 
ISO International Organization for 
Standardization 
IT Information Technology 
KGB Committee for State Security (in Russian 
Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti) 
LOAC Law of Armed Conflict 
NIST National Institute of Standards and 
Technology 
OAS Organization of American States 
OUP Oxford University Press 
PCA Permanent Court of Arbitration 
PCIJ Permanent Court of International Justice 
Saudi Aramco Saudi Arabian Oil Company 
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
UN United Nations 
UN GGE United Nations Group of Governmental 
Experts on Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the 
Context of International Security 
UNGA United Nations General Assembly 
UNSC United Nations Security Council 
  
 4 
Introduction 
The fast development of computers and communication networks1 as well as the beginning of 
the so-called Information Age2 has caused a reliance on information and communication 
technologies in an exponentially increasing number of States.3 Networked systems and fast 
developing technology are now considered not only characteristics of the modern society but 
also important aspects of national security.4 Correspondingly, it has been claimed that 
“[l]ongstanding notions of sovereignty fall apart when it comes to cyber operations.”5 
Increased dependency on information and communication technologies (hereinafter ICT) and 
inherently dual-use networks6 offer hostile actors the opportunity to exploit the advantages 
that cyberspace offers, irrespective of the aim of the exploitation, e.g. achieving financial gain 
or military advantage, gathering information or influencing State behaviour.7 As a result, 
interconnected and interdependent information infrastructure and architecture represent new 
strategic targets8 as well as mediums through which offensive operations can be conducted.9 
Thus, during the last decade “cyber” has become one of the most frequently used prefixes in 
the international security discourse.10 
As expected, a broad academic and political discussion has followed the evolution of cyber 
domain, gearing into full force after the cyber attacks in Estonia in 2007. Especially after the 
                                                
1 The rapid development started from the 1960s. See International Institute for Strategic Studies. Strategic 
Dossier. The Evolution of the Cyber Domain: the Implications for National and Global Security. Abington: 
Routledge 2015, p 7 ff. 
2 The term was used by Alvin Toffler to describe the “Third Wave” society, which represented the transition of 
the developed States’ societies from Industrial Age to Information Age. A. Toffler. The Third Wave. New York: 
Bantam books 1981. 
3 “The information age society is highly dependent on computer and internet connections to accomplish tasks 
both mundane and critical.” V.M. Antolin-Jenkins. Defining the Parameters of Cyberwar Operations: Looking 
for Law in All the Wrong Places? – Naval Law Review 2005, Vol. 51, p 132. 
4 K. Geers. Pandemonium: Nation States, National Security, and the Internet. – L. Vihul (ed.). The Tallinn 
Papers: Numbers 1-9 (2014-2015). Tallinn: NATO CCD COE Publications 2015, p 1. 
5 D. Perera. Schmidle: Cyber Ops Might Require New Combatant Command Structure. – FierceGovernmentIT, 
15.05.2011, www.fiercegovernmentit.com/story/schmidle-cyber-ops-might-require-new-combatant-command-
structure/2011-05-15 (visited 15.04.2016). 
6 Dual use indicates that networks are being used for military as well as civilian purposes. 
7 Among others, C. C. Joyner and C. Lotrionte note that, “the technology-intensive Information Age brings with 
it the opportunities for ‘cyber-crime’, ‘cyber-war’ or, as more aptly put, the prosecution of ‘Information 
Warfare’”. C.C. Joyner, C. Lotrionte. Information Warfare as International Coercion: Elements of a Legal 
Framework. – European Journal of International Law 2001, Vol. 12, p 826. See also R. Buchan. Cyber Attacks: 
Unlawful Uses of Force or Prohibited Interventions? – Journal of Conflict & Security Law 2012, Vol. 17, No. 2, 
p 211. P.W. Franzese. Sovereignty in Cyberspace: Can it Exist? – Air Force Law Review 2009, Vol. 64, pp 2–3. 
8 R.A. Miller, D.T. Kuehl. Cyberspace and the “First Battle” in 21st-century War. – Defense Horizons 2009, 
Vol. 68, p 2. 
9 M. Roscini. Cyber Operations and the Use of Force in International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
(hereinafter OUP) 2014, p 12. R. Geiss, H. Lahmann. Cyber Warfare: Applying the Principle of Distinction in an 
Interconnected Space – Israeli Law Review 2012, Vol. 45, p 384. 
10 M.E. O’Connell. Cyber Security Without Cyber War. – Journal of Conflict & Security Law 2012, Vol. 17, No. 
2, p 187. 
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2010 Stuxnet attack in Iran, the feared hostility of cyber operations and their possible 
destructive effects shifted the focus of the discourse rapidly to hypothetical cyber operations 
with so severe consequences as to fulfil the criteria of the use of force under United Nations 
(hereinafter UN) Charter11 Article 2(4) or even of an armed attack. Even though no known 
cyber operation thus far has crossed the threshold of an armed attack,12 alarming statements 
have been made13 and publications written14 about cyber war looming in our future as well as 
destructive cyberwarfare capabilities being developed by States, which would eventually lead 
to a cyber “Pearl Harbor”.15 Thus, resulting in most of the discourse revolving around the 
application of the law of the armed conflict (hereinafter LOAC), law of the use of force and 
the law of self-defence as reflected in UN Charter Article 51.16 
                                                
11 Charter of the United Nations. 26 June 1945. – www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/ (visited 15.04.2016). 
12 M.N. Schmitt (ed.). Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press (hereinafter CUP) 2013, p 57. 
13 The US General Keith B. Alexander has stated, “Catastrophic cyberattacks loom in the nation’s future.” 
Similarly, an open letter to George W. Bush warned already in 2002 the world of a cyber attack that would 
“devastate the national psyche and economy more broadly than did the 9/11 attacks”. General Keith B. 
Alexander’s keynote address to senior government security officials and industry executives attending a 
cybersecurity conference. – 30.10.2013, archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121030 (visited 25 
March 2016); Various authors. Open Letter to President George W. Bush. – 2002, 
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cyberwar/etc/letter.html (visited 20.03.2016). 
14 For works of proponents of cyberwar see for example, R.A. Clarke, R.K. Knake. Cyber War: The Next Threat 
to National Security and What to Do About It. New York: HarperCollins Publishers 2010; J.P. Farwell, R. 
Rohozinski. Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War. – Survival 2011, Vol. 53; R. Buchan, N. Tsagourias. Cyber 
War and International Law. – Journal of Conflict & Security Law 2012, Vol. 17, No. 2; Y. Dinstein. The 
Principle of Distinction and Cyber War in International Armed Conflict. – Journal of Conflict & Security Law 
2012, Vol. 17, No. 2; J. Stone. Cyber War Will Take Place! – Journal of Strategic Studies 2013, Vol. 36, No. 1; 
G. McGraw. Cyber war is Inevitable (Unless We Build Security In). – Journal of Strategic Studies 2013, Vol. 36, 
No. 1; P.W. Singer, A. Friedman. Cybersecurity and Cyberwar. Oxford: OUP 2014; J.D. Ohlin, K. Govern, C. 
Finkelstein (eds.). Cyber War: Law and Ethics for Virtual Conflicts. Oxford: OUP 2015. For the opposing 
opinion see T. Rid. Cyber War Will Not Take Place. Oxford: OUP 2013; J. A. Lewis. The Cyber War Has Not 
Begun. – Center for Strategic and International Studies 2010. 
15 Leon E. Panetta stated that “[t]he collective result of these kinds of attacks could be a cyber Pearl Harbor; an 
attack that would cause physical destruction and the loss of life”. L.E. Panetta. Remarks by Secretary Panetta on 
Cybersecurity to the Business Execturives for National Security. – 11.10.2013, 
www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/secretary-panettas-speech-cybersecurity/p29262 (visited 01.04.2016). 
16 Some consider the Tallinn Manual as the epitome of the discourse on the application of LOAC. M.N. Schmitt, 
Tallinn Manual. Cf. M. Roscini. Referenced work; T.A. Morth. Considering Our Position: Viewing Information 
Warfare as a Use of Force Prohibited by Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. – Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law 1998, Vol. 10; Y. Dinstein. Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense. – International Law 
Studies 2001, Vol. 76; E.T. Jensen. Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of Force 
Revoking the Right to Self-Defense. – Stanford Journal of International Law 2002, Vol. 38; E. Kodar. Computer 
Network Attacks in the Grey Areas of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello. – Baltic Yearbook of International Law 
2009, Vol. 9; M. Hoisington. Cyberwarfare and the Use of Force Giving Rise to the Right of Self-Defense. – 
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 2009, Vol 32, No. 2; P. Palojärvi. A Battle of Bits 
and Bytes: Computer Network Attacks and the Law of Armed Conflict. Helsinki: Publications of the Erik 
Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights, University of Helsinki 2009; M.C. Waxman. Cyber 
Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4). – Yale Journal of International Law 2011, Vol. 
36; N. Tsagourias. Cyber Attacks, Self-Defence and the Problem of Attribution. – Journal of Conflict & Security 
Law 2012, Vol. 17. No. 2; S.J. Shackelford. From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in 
International Law. – Berkley Journal of International Law 2013, Vol. 27, No. 1. 
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Undoubtedly, the debate around the application of LOAC is of great importance in the context 
of cyber operations with debilitating and destructive consequences. Whilst they could be 
feasible, the realisation of such cataclysms in the current state of affairs seems unlikely.17 The 
reality is that even though the empirical trend shows a steady rise in the amount of cyber 
operations over the past dozen years,18 all of those operations can be considered low-intensity, 
meaning that they do not manifest in physical damage and are thus not captured by Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter or the damage caused by the operation can be considered 
insignificant.19 This will most likely be also the trend in the future. As such, the focus of the 
discourse has been, if not displaced then skipping certain fundamental topics for the past 
decade. Operations that do not cross the threshold of use of force still affect State sovereignty. 
Moreover, besides the question of offensive cyber operations, the fundamental 
characterisation of sovereignty in mostly intangible cyberspace requires attention, which it 
has not received thus far.  
Therefore, understanding the concept of sovereignty and the exercise thereof by States is in 
the current state of affairs of outmost importance. By asking “wrong” questions about 
cyberspace,20 States and academics alike are going around in circles, failing to consider the 
wider implications of cyber operations and cyberspace itself to international law. During the 
Cold War the space race was largely conducted between two States – the USA and the Soviet 
Union. These States were also the biggest actors deciding over the framework regulating the 
use of such technology. However, when it comes to “cyber-race”, the circle of decision-
makers with different interests in mind is continually increasing. Whilst there is a rich 
literature covering the application of LOAC to cyber operations, such interpretations are 
grounded in the hypotheticals that they have been built on. Whereas the basic questions 
concerning the foundation of international law have been left aside, pulling thus away from 
the reality that States’ are facing: breaches of sovereignty through low-intensity cyber 
operations in an organised hypocrisy. The latter phrase has been borrowed from Stephen D. 
Krasner, who in his book Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy contends that States as 
                                                
17 S. Watts. Low-Intensity Cyber Operations and the Principle of Non-Intervention. – J.D. Ohlin, K. Govern, C. 
Finkelstein (eds.). Cyber War: Law and Ethics for Virtual Conflicts. Oxford: OUP 2015, p 250. 
18 T. Rid. Cyber War Will Not Take Place. – Journal of Strategic Studies 2013, Vol. 35, No. 1, p 15. 
19 Even though some scholars consider the Stuxnet cyber attack in Iran in 2010 as crossing the threshold of at 
least use of force, this thesis makes the claim that even in the case of Stuxnet, the damage can be considered 
insignificant, therefore, not crossing the threshold of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Yet, the Stuxnet attack can 
still be interpreted as coercive in the meaning of the non-intervention principle. 
20 G.D. Brown. The Wrong Questions About Cyberspace. – Military Law Review 2014, Vol. 217, p 214. 
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sovereigns often violate long-standing norms, if it benefits them or is otherwise important in 
order to achieve their aspirations and goals.21 
This thesis focuses on the (un)changed concept of sovereignty and exercise thereof vis-à-vis 
cyberspace, exploring the “organised hypocrisy” that surrounds the regulation of offensive 
cyber operations, corresponding State practice and relevant international law. Thus, the main 
research questions of the present work are: How does sovereignty apply and how do States 
assert and exercise their sovereign rights in cyberspace? 
The hypotheses of the thesis are two-fold: firstly, the concept of sovereignty remains to a 
large extent unchanged in relation to cyberspace. States exercise sovereignty differently in 
different spheres,22 however, the concept of sovereignty remains the cornerstone of the 
international legal system. Besides territorial sovereignty, normative decisions made on the 
international plane reflect exercises of State sovereignty regarding to the development and 
interpretation of existing international law in the context of cyberspace. Secondly, States 
make the conscious decision of non-compliance with international law when it comes to low-
intensity cyber operations, using operations that are effective, below the threshold of Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter to further their own strategic goals. Cyberspace allows States to use 
the anonymity and ambiguity offered by low-intensity cyber operations to further their 
strategic ambition and at the same time avoid responsibility under international law.  
Thus, the aim of the thesis is not to give a comprehensive overview of the concept and history 
of sovereignty, as that would be outside of the scope and ambition of the thesis. Plenty of 
authors have offered an excellent contribution as to that regard.23 Instead, the thesis aims to 
construe its case about sovereignty narrowly in the confines of the central topics of 
cybersecurity and cyberspace and thereby offer a novel view on how States exercise 
sovereignty in cyberspace. The thesis uses mainly comparative and historical methods. In 
order to do so, the thesis looks at relevant international treaties, case law, State practice and 
academic works pertaining to the concept of sovereignty and exercise thereof. 
The fundamental question in any discourse regarding cyber operations has been how to apply 
lex lata to “new” circumstances, yet stay “faithful to enduring principles, while accounting for 
                                                
21 S.D. Krasner. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. 
22 ICJ. 09.04.1949. Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania). ICJ 
Reports 1949. Separate opinion of Judge Alvarez, p 43. 
23 See for example, N.G. Onuf. Sovereignty: Outline of a Conceptual History. – Alternatives: Global, Local, 
Political Fall 1991, Vol. 16, No. 4; M.P. Ferreira-Snyman. The Evolution of State Sovereignty: A Historical 
Overview. – 2006, uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/3689/Fundamina%20Snyman.finaal.pdf?sequence=1 
(visited 15.04.2016). 
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changing times and technologies?”24 International law, which usually is more than a few steps 
behind the development of technology, has found itself struggling during the past decade to 
provide affirmative interpretations of existing rules applicable to cyber operations or 
cyberspace in general. For quite some time, cyberspace and actions conducted therein were 
considered as the “Wild West”: no State would be able to exercise territorial control and no 
laws would apply.25 The metaphor of a “Wild West” lost its ground when the 2013 United 
Nations Group of Governmental Experts (hereinafter UN GGE) Report affirmed the 
applicability of international law to cyber security.26 Yet doubts about the sufficiency of the 
current international law regulation to provide an effective legal framework for cyber 
operations have remained. 
It must be kept in mind that it is not the first time that technology has taken a significant leap 
forward and international law has been tasked with dealing with the accompanying changes. 
New technologies raise new issues,27 but core questions, such as sovereignty, remain the same 
and therefore, the existing international law should provide a solution or an interpretation for 
new technologies also in the future.  
The literature on the applicability of international law to cyber operations continues to 
proliferate at a fast pace. However, there is surprisingly little literature dedicated to the 
question of exercises of sovereignty in a cyber-specific context. Most of the existing literature 
ponders about the application of sovereignty in abstracto to cyberspace, i.e. whether it applies 
at all. Thus, the existing literature does not answer the research question per se, allowing the 
present thesis to contribute to the existing discourse by exploring the theoretical framework 
and exercises of sovereignty within existing State practice. By inquiring into the exercise of 
sovereignty in concreto, the thesis takes a rather practical approach by incorporating as much 
State practice as appropriate to illustrate the issue.  
                                                
24 H.H. Koh. International Law in Cyberspace. – Harvard International Law Journal 2012, Vol. 54, p 2. 
25 For examples of academic discussion surrounding the Wild West metaphor, see, L.J. Gibbons. No Regulation, 
Government Regulation, or Self-Regulation: Social Enforcement or Social Contracting for Governance in 
Cyberspace. – Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 1997, Vol. 6, No. 3; R. Ku. Foreword: A Brave New 
Cyberworld? – Thomas Jefferson Law Review 2000, Vol. 22, pp 125-126; S. Shipchandler. Note, The Wild 
Wild Web: Nonregulation as the Answer to the Regulatory Question. – Cornell International Law Journal 2000, 
Vol. 33; D. Yan. Virtual Reality: Can We ride Trademark Law to Surf Cyberspace? – Fordham Intellectual 
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 2000, Vol. 10; S. Biegel. Beyond our Control? Confronting the 
Limits of Our Legal System in the Age of Cyberspace. Cambridge: MIT Press 2001, pp 13–18. 
26 UNGA. A/68/98. 24.06.2013. Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information 
and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security: Note by Secretary-General, para 19. 
27 H.H. Koh. Referenced work, p 3. 
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One of the main characteristics of many cyber-related scholarly works is the inquiry into what 
law ought to be in order to address the challenges of cyberspace wholly and efficiently.28 The 
present thesis will focus on lex lata, i.e. what the law is, not what it ought to be.29 It is not the 
task of this thesis to fill in the gaps in the existing regulation; however, they will be brought 
into the reader’s attention through the discussion on whether the existing framework that is 
being applies is adequate or antiquated. As the state practice surrounding the questions of 
sovereignty and intervention as well as cyber operations is far from settled, it is better to leave 
the “question open than to answer it incorrectly”.30 
Since the literature surrounding cyber operations is fairly extensive and rich there are some 
delimitations that must be set in order to focus the present work properly. Firstly, the question 
of sovereignty operates exclusively with respect to States. Thus, even though non-State actors 
play a significant role in the cyber discourse, the present thesis will focus on State-on-State 
interactions, taking into account only State activities in cyberspace. Secondly, as pertaining to 
State practice, cyber operations can take several forms depending on their characterisation but 
for the purpose of this thesis, cyber operations are understood as entailing either cyber attacks 
or cyber operations, which can involve exploitations. Since cyber incidents mostly do not 
have intent to harm and are considered accidental, they cannot be considered to have a 
coercive nature. On the other hand, extensive cyber campaigns, even though feasible in the 
future, are not likely to realise in the nearest future. Thirdly, only cyber operations that fall 
below the threshold of use of force according to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter will be 
discussed. Thus, the thesis limits itself to peacetime operations and conflict situations as such 
will be excluded from the scope. Last, but not least, the present thesis will not dive into the 
problem of attribution. The problematic and difficulties of attribution are well documented 
and need only a brief comment in the thesis.31 The thesis lies on the premise that all cyber 
operations discussed in the thesis are considered State-organised or at least State-sponsored. 
                                                
28 See C.C. Joyner, C. Lotrionte. Referenced work. D. Brown. A Proposal for an International Convention; S.J. 
Shackelford. From Nuclear War to Net War; J. Barkham. Information Warfare and International Law on the Use 
of Force. – NYU Journal of International Law and Policy 2001, Vol. 34, No. 56, p 57. 
29 John Austin has stated “The existence of a law is one thing: its merits or demerits are another. Whether law be, 
is one inquiry: whether it ought to be, or whether it agree with a given or assumed test, is another and a distinct 
inquiry.” J. Austin. The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. London: John Murray 1832, p 278. 
30 L. Oppenheim. The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method. – The American Journal of 
International Law 1908, Vol. 2, No. 2, p 318, p 335. 
31 See, D.B. Hollis. An e-SOS for Cyberspace. – Harvard International Law Journal 2011, Vol. 52, pp 397–401. 
E.M. Mudrinich. Cyber 3.0: The Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace and the 
Attribution Problem. – Air Force Law Review 2012, Vol. 68; M.N. Schmitt. “Below the Threshold” Cyber 
Operations: The Countermeasures Response Option and International Law. – Virginia Journal of International 
Law 2014, Vol. 54; E.T. Jensen. Cyber Sovereignty: The Way Ahead. – Texas International Law Journal 2015, 
Vol. 50, No. 2, p 277. 
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Admittedly, none of the target States has been able to fully attribute the attacks on a particular 
States. There are suspects in each case, but full attribution has not been achieved. Yet, if the 
thesis would not accept as a premise that the operations were indeed State offensive activities, 
due to the fact that they were never fully attributed, discussing breaches of sovereignty and 
the application of the non-intervention framework would be increasingly difficult. Thus, 
while recognising that in reality such offensive State operations require full attribution,32 the 
existence thereof is taken in this thesis as given. 
This thesis is divided into five main chapters. The first chapter offers an overview of the 
vocabulary used in the cybersecurity discourse. The second chapter focuses on the general 
concept on sovereignty, while the third chapter explains how sovereignty is applied in 
cyberspace. The fourth chapter elaborates on the exercise of State sovereignty vis-à-vis 
cyberspace and explores different modes of State action. The fifth chapter presents an analysis 
of international law and cyberspace juxtaposed.  
 
  
                                                
32 Since violations of the non-intervention principle are considered internationally wrongful acts, it is apt to 
remind that the UN GGE 2015 report emphasised that “States must meet their international obligations regarding 
internationally wronful act attributable to them under international law”, yet the mere indication that an ICT 
activity was launched or otherwise originated from a State’s territory, from its infrastructure may be insufficient 
for State-attribution. Furthermore, the accusations of organising and implementing wrongful acts that are 
brought against a State must be substantiated. UNGA. A/70/174. 22.07.2015. Group of Governmental Experts 
on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security: 
Note by the Secretary-General, p 12. 
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1. The vocabulary of cybersecurity 
Cybersecurity discourse pertaining to international law is inevitably legal as well as 
political.33 Not only does international law serve the political and strategic interests of 
different States but the vocabulary they use within international law highlights the emphasis 
one wishes to set. Thus, it is important to note the terminological differences among different 
actors and explain the main terms and concepts of this thesis. 
International law offers today a wide variety of specialist vocabularies.34 Cybersecurity is one 
of them, as the field has created in the matter of the past two decades its own vocabulary that 
unless explained caters only for special audiences with special interest and carries a special 
ethos.35 Characterised by the notions of malleability and fluidness, the vocabulary used 
depends on the perspective of the actors involved. Different participants in the discourse, all 
equipped with a specific bias towards the expert vocabulary, aim at affecting the outcomes 
that later manifest in the inter-State relations and international law discussions.36 
It is important to note that whilst considering any term with the prefix “cyber”,37 it is safe to 
say that none of them has an agreed upon definition. It is a political notion anchored to the 
convergence of different technologies38 and thus, there are as many definitions as there are 
actors in this discourse. Some of the terms have been defined by individual States in their 
cyber strategies.39 Some have acquired a definition through the works of scholars and 
standardisation bodies.40 Either way, it is useful to give a short overview of some of the 
specific terms used in this thesis, since they are not part of the everyday public international 
law discourse. One must also keep in mind that it is highly likely that no matter what 
definition we give to any of the cyber-related terms, it is either too narrow or too wide as well 
                                                
33 Generally about the inevitablity of politics in international law, see M. Koskenniemi. The Politics of 
International Law. Oxford: Hart Publishing Ltd 2011 and for his updated view on the matter, M. Koskenniemi. 
The Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later. – European Journal of International Law 2009, Vol. 20, No. 
1. 
34 See M. Koskenniemi. Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later, p 12. 
35 Ibid, p 9. 
36 Ibid. 
37 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “cyber” means “relating to information technology, the Internet, 
and virtual reality”. The Oxford Compact English Dictionary. Oxford: OUP 2003, p 268. 
38 IISS. Dossier, p 15. 
39 For example NATO CCD COE has collected some of the definitions from States’ cyber strategies in their 
Cyber Definitions database. However, this list is by no means comprehensive and definitive. NATO CCD COE. 
Cyber Definitions Database. – ccdcoe.org/cyber-definitions.html (visited 15.03.2016). Alternative list of 
definitions is provided by IISS. Dossier, pp 5-11.  
40 For example of scholarly work see M.N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual, p 15. Katharina Ziolkowski proposes her 
own definition of cyber espionage in K. Ziolkowski. Peacetime Cyber Espionage – New Tendencies in Public 
International Law. – K. Ziolkowski (ed.). Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace. Tallinn: NATO 
CCD COE Publications 2013, p 429. 
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as led by a bias of the writer and therefore, the definitions chosen are used only for the 
purposes of this thesis. 
One of the widest terms used is “cybersecurity”. When it comes to providing a definition for 
it, there are two different strands of interpretations. First strand, as for example proposed by 
the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (hereinafter NIST), focuses on the 
security of cyberspace itself, defining cybersecurity as the “ability to protect or defend the use 
of cyberspace from cyber attacks.” 41  The other strand of interpretation, offered by 
International Organization for Standardization (hereinafter ISO) and International 
Electrotechnical Commission (hereinafter IEC), however centres on the confidentiality, 
integrity and accessibility of the information processed in cyberspace.42 When Western 
countries often combine the two strands,43 the Sino-Russo approach focuses mainly on the 
security of information, leading them to use a different set of terms altogether. For example, 
Russia and China use the term “international information security”, which is not to be equated 
with the Western term “cybersecurity”, since it insists that international peace and security 
concerns go beyond mere information infrastructure concerns.44 Focusing the discussion not 
on information infrastructure but on the information therein, highlights different solutions, 
different actors and different interests as will be explained in Chapter 4.1. Both views – the 
Western as well as the Sino-Russian one – render some aspect of the discourse visible, with 
pushing other aspects consciously to the background.45 Choosing and using knowingly a 
different vocabulary is also a manifestation of a focus point that the State as a sovereign has 
decided to set in the discourse.  
                                                
41 R. Kissel. Glossary of Key Information Security Terms. – Cybersecurity, 
www.nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2013/NIST.IR.7298r2.pdf (visited 10.03.2016). 
42 ISO, IEC. ISO/IEC 27032:2012 Information technology – Security techniques – Guidelines for cybersecurity. 
– www.iso27001security.com/html/27032.html (visited 10.03.2016). The same interpretation is also used by 
some States, see Australian Government’s definitions of cyber security. Australian Government. Cyber Security. 
– www.ag.gov.au/RightsAndProtections/CyberSecurity/Pages/default.aspx (visited 10.03.2016). 
43  For example see France’s Strategy. Information systems defence and security. – 2011, 
www.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/IMG/pdf/2011-02-15_Information_system_defence_and_security_-
_France_s_strategy.pdf (visited 10.03.2016). Similarly, the US approach combines the protection of information 
infrastructure with the protection of information contained therein. US Department of Defense. Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms. – Joint Publication 1-02, 08.11.2010 (as amended through 15.02.2016), 
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf (visited 15.04.2016), p 57. 
44 See for example Institute of Information Security Issues of Moscow State University and Conflict Studies 
Research Centre. Russia’s “Draft Convention on International Information Security”, A Commentary. – 2012, 
www.academia.edu/1611951/Russia_s_Draft_Convention_on_International_Information_Security_-
_A_Commentary (visited 10.03.2016). 
45 M. Koskenniemi. Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later, p. 11. Koskenniemi also states, “What is 
being put forward as significant and what gets pushed into darkness is determined by the choice of the language 
through which the matter is looked at, and which provides the basis for the application of a particular kind of law 
and legal expertise. That this choice is not usually seen as such – that is as a choice – by the vocabularies, but 
instead something natural, renders them ideological.” 
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International bodies, such as the UN GGE have often used a compromise wording using the 
phrase “security in the development and use of ICTs”46 in their deliberations regarding 
cybersecurity. For the purpose of this thesis, the term “cybersecurity” is used combining the 
security of the information infrastructure and architecture with the confidentiality, integrity 
and accessibility of information processed therein.  
Secondly, the definition of “cyberspace” has had over time different focuses. Some have 
defined it through its characteristically man-made nature,47 some have focused on the use of 
electromagnetic spectrum.48 The understanding of “cyberspace”49 for the purposes of this 
thesis follows the definition provided by NIST, that is: “A global domain within the 
information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information systems 
infrastructures including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and 
embedded processors and controllers.”50 Again, in the Sino-Russo approach a parallel term of 
“information space” is used in international discourse, which is defined as the sphere of 
activity connected with the formation, creation, conversion, transfer, use and storage of 
information and which has an effect on individual and social consciousness, the information 
infrastructure and information itself.51 Even though the focus of both of the definitions is at 
opposite directions, what transpires for the present thesis from both of them is that even 
though to a large extent cyberspace is considered an intangible space, it is nevertheless 
supported by physical infrastructure, which connects it to the physical world.52 
Lastly, and most importantly, it is of essence to define what is understood under the term 
“cyber operations”. As the literature on “cyber” continues to proliferate, scholarly works offer 
numerous definitions to cyber operations, cyber attacks,53 cyber exploitations and information 
                                                
46 UNGA. A/65/201. 30.07.2010. Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information 
and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security: Note by the Secretary-General; UNGA. UN 
GGE 2013 Report; UNGA. UN GGE 2015 Report. 
47 G.H. Todd. Armed Attack in Cyberspace: Deterring Asymmetric Warfare with an Asymmetric Definition. – 
Air Force Law Review 2009, Vol. 64, p 68. 
48 See D.J. Ryan, M. Dion, E. Tikk, J.J.C.H. Ryan. International Cyberlaw: A Normative Approach. – 
Georgetown Journal of International Law Summer 2011, Vol. 42, No. 4, p 1167. 
49  The word “cyberspace” was first used by William Gibson in his book Neuromancer. W. Gibson. 
Neuromancer. New York: Berkley Publishing Group 1989, p 128. 
50 R. Kissel. Referenced work, p 58. The definition is identical to US DoD definition in US DoD. Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, p 58. 
51 Institute of Information Security Issues of Moscow State University. Referenced work, p 32. 
52 R. Bryant. What kind of space is cyberspace? – Minerva – An Internet Journal of Philosophy 2001, Vol. 5, p 
138; N. Tsagourias. The Legal Status of Cyberspace. – N. Tsagourias, R. Buchan (eds.). Research Handbook on 
International Law and Cyberspace. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2015, p 15. 
53 For example Shackelford defines computer network attack as “hostile attack hostile attack by one nation or 
hostile party against the important information technology /…/ systems and networks of another”. Waxman 
characterises cyber attack as an “effort to alter, disrupt, or destroy computer systems or networks or the 
information or programs on them”. Palojärvi adds to prior definitions that the aim of the attack is to “manipulate, 
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operations54 etc. One way of distinguishing different activities in cyberspace is by assessing 
their intent and severity. From that follows a spectrum, which starts from the least severe 
activity: “cyber incident”. It stands for a possibly unintentional activity resulting in actual or 
potentially adverse effect on an information system and/or the information therein.55 “Cyber 
attack” (often also computer network attack or CNA), however, presumes intent and targets 
an “enterprise’s use of cyberspace for the purpose of disrupting, disabling, destroying, or 
maliciously controlling a computing environment/infrastructure; or destroying the integrity of 
the data or stealing controlled information”.56 Tallinn Manual offers an alternative definition 
stating that “cyber attack is a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is 
reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to 
objects”.57 “Cyber exploitation” (often also computer network exploitation or CNE) combines 
the enabling operations and intelligence collection capabilities conducted through the use of 
computer networks in order to gather data from target or adversary’s information systems or 
networks.58 When turning back to the original question of a definition for cyber operations, 
then for the purpose of this thesis, cyber operations are understood as comprising of cyber 
attacks and cyber exploitations which stay below the use of force threshold, but can be 
characterised by intent, specific target, coordination, strategy and motivation. Hence, they are 
more severe and sophisticated than cyber incidents and must possess the element of intent. 
 
 
Figure 1. Spectrum of cyber activities 
                                                                                                                                                   
corrupt or hide the information that the systems rely on to function properly”. S. Shackelford. From Nuclear War 
to Net War, p 199; M.C. Waxman. Referenced work, p 422; P. Palojärvi. Referenced work, p 27. 
54 See for example NIST’s definition: “The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, 
computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert 
with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and 
automated decision-making process, information, and information systems while protecting our own.” R. Kissel. 
Referenced work, p 94. 
55 Ibid, p 57. 
56 R. Kissel. Referenced work, p 57. 
57 M.N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual, p 106. 
58 R. Kissel. Referenced work, p 41. 
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Additionally, throughout the thesis the concept of “information infrastructure and 
architecture” will be used. For the purposes of clarity, infrastructure describes the set of 
components that make up a system (e.g. submarine cables, satellites, fibre optic cables, 
computers, servers), while architecture describes the design of the components and the 
relationships between them.59 Hence, cyberspace is built on an information infrastructure and 
has a particular information architecture. Lastly, the fourth chapter makes use of the technical 
term distributed denial-of-service attack. Distributed denial-of-service (hereinafter DDoS) is 
an attack, where multitude of compromised systems, i.e. botnets, attack a single target. That 
causes a denial of service for the users of the targeted systems and the target system shuts 
down.60  
                                                
59 E. Tikk-Ringas, C. Spirito. Lecture series on Information Infrastructure and Architecture at University of 
Tartu. – Autumn 2014/2015, www.uttv.ee/naita?id=20298&sessioon=41911740494863030249 (visited 
10.03.2016). 
60 TechTarget. Distributed Denial-of-Service Attack Definition. – 
searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/distributed-denial-of-service-attack (visited 20.03.2016). 
 16 
2. Sovereignty as a concept 
The concept of sovereignty, albeit more often than not interdisciplinary contested, has proven 
to be highly adaptable over time.61 It has survived many eras – de-colonisation, globalisation, 
the rise of supra-national organisations – and thus, some would say it has over time acquired a 
borderline mythical quality.62 Deploring the ambiguity of the concept has according to Hent 
Kalmo and Quentin Skinner become itself a recurring motif in the rich literature on 
sovereignty.63 Even though dubbed by some as the “bad word”,64 sovereignty as a concept is 
still at the heart of the international legal system and the sovereign State is still the ultimate 
member of international community as well as the most important actor in the international 
legal system.65 
Sovereignty is resolutely also surviving the digital age, thus before turning to the concept of 
sovereignty vis-à-vis cyberspace, one has to inquire into the general meaning of sovereignty. 
The following chapter elaborates on sovereignty as the cornerstone of international law and 
on the questionable death of sovereignty. 
2.1. Sovereignty as a cornerstone of international law 
The Peace of Westphalia (1648) is often seen as the point of inauguration for modern 
international law and for the modern State. It represents a moment, when the core concept of 
sovereignty became part of international law.66 Over time, sovereignty has become not only 
the core notion of statehood but also the axiomatic principle on which “the whole 
international law rests”.67 Most, if not to say all principles of international law rely directly or 
indirectly on State sovereignty.68 Sovereignty, even though, some doubt its necessity in 
                                                
61 B. Fassbender. Sovereignty and Constitutionalism in International Law. – N. Walker (ed.). Sovereignty in 
Transition. Oxford: Hart Publishing 2003, p 115. 
62 L. Henkin. The Mythology of Sovereignty. – R.St.J. Macdonald (ed.). Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya. The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1993, p 351; B. Simma, D-E. Kahn, G. Nolte, A. Paulus (eds.). The Charter of the 
Uniter Nations. A Commentary. 3rd ed. Volume 1. Oxford: OUP 2012, p 135. 
63 H. Kalmo, Q. Skinner. Introduction: a concept in fragments. – H. Kalmo, Q. Skinner (eds.). Sovereignty in 
Fragments: The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept. Cambridge: CUP 2010, p 1. 
64 L. Henkin. International Law: Politics and Values. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995, p 8. 
65 M. Koskenniemi. From Apology to Utopia. Cambridge: CUP 2005, p 236. 
66 J. Crawford, M. Koskenniemi (eds.). The Cambridge Companion to International Law. Cambridge: CUP 
2012, p 30; D. Philpott. Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations 
Princeton: Princeton University Press 2001, Chapter 5. 
67 ICJ. 27.06.1986. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States). 
ICJ Reports 1986, para 263. 
68 S. Besson. Sovereignty. – Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, OUP 2011, online edition, 
opil.ouplaw.com/home/epil (visited 29.03.2016). 
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today’s world,69 is still inherent to Statehood and often described as the “basic constitutional 
doctrine of the law of nations”.70 
It is easy to get tangled in the web of different terminology and opinions.71 In the words of 
Lassa Oppenheim, “there exists perhaps no conception, the meaning of which is more 
controversial than that of sovereignty. It is an undisputable fact that this conception […] had 
never had a meaning which was universally agreed upon”.72 Furthermore, much of the 
literature focuses on justifying State sovereignty, when in reality the crucial question in times 
of contestation and conflict is the extent of it.73 Nowadays, the model of absolute or complete 
sovereignty cannot be considered valid, taking into account the interdependencies among 
States and the changes States have gone through since 1945.74  
In the most general notion, sovereignty means the totality of international rights and duties 
recognised by international law75 that reside in a State.76 However, the appropriate legal 
starting point of this analysis ought to be the UN Charter Article 2(1), which establishes the 
principle of sovereign equality of States,77 assuring the legal equality of States.78 One of the 
corollary principles deriving from the notion of State sovereignty is the principle of territorial 
sovereignty, which defines sovereignty by reference to State’s physical territory. Leaving 
aside the various theories on the legal function of territory,79 there is a consensus according to 
                                                
69 M. Koskenniemi. What Use for Sovereignty Today? – Asian Journal of International Law 2011, Vol. 1, p 62. 
70 J. Crawford. Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed. Oxford: OUP 2012, p 447. 
71 A. Plekksepp. Riigi suveräänsus karistusõiguse ajaloolises ja euroopastumise kontekstis. – H. Kalmo, M. Luts-
Sootak. Iganenud või igavene? Tekste kaasaegsest suveräänsusest. Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus 2010, p 186-
187. 
72 L. Oppenheim. International Law: A Treatise Vol 1, 4th ed. A.D. McNair (ed.) London: Longmans, Green & 
Co 1928, p 137. 
73 For further discussion on the pure fact view versus the legal view, see M. Koskenniemi. From Apology to 
Utopia, p 238-239. He argues that sovereignty is essentially torn between the two approaches. The legal 
approach seeks to bring sovereignty under the umbrella of international law as the higher normative code, which 
would them tame States’ subjective politics and offer States thus sovereignty within the law. The pure fact 
approach on the other hand states that sovereignty is external to international law and it is rather to be construed 
as a means to fulfill the inherent liberties of States. Sovereignty as a concept is contested, because no adequate 
choice can be made between the two positions.  
74 L. Condorelli, A. Cassese. Is Leviathan Still Holding Sway over International Dealings? – A. Cassese (ed.) 
Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law. Oxford: OUP 2012, p 22. Cf. L. Mälksoo. Russian 
Approaches to International Law. Oxford: OUP 2015, p 100 ff. 
75 ICJ. 11.04.1949. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations. Advisory Opinion. ICJ 
Reports 1949, p 180. 
76 J. Crawford. Chance, Order, Change: The Course of International Law. The Hague: Hague Academy of 
International Law 2014, p 88. 
77 UN Charter, Article 2(1). 
78 Academics emphasise that Article 2(1) assures juridical, not political, military, economic, geographic, 
demographic or other equality of States. K. Ziolkowski. General Principles of International Law as Applicable in 
Cyberspace. – K. Ziolkowski (ed.). Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace. Tallinn: NATO CCD 
COE Publications 2013, p 156. 
79 For various theories on the legal function of State’s territory, see S. Torres Bernárdez. Territorial Sovereignty. 
– R. Bernhardt (ed.). Encyclopedia of Public International Law Vol. IV. Amsterdam: Elsevier 2000, p 823 ff. 
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which a State exercises full and exclusive authority over its territory.80 Max Huber in the 1928 
Island of Palmas Arbitration award links the exercise of effective power over certain territory 
with sovereignty by stating as follows: “Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies 
independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, 
to the exclusivity of any other States, the functions of a State.”81 International Court of Justice 
(hereinafter ICJ) added to that notion stating that “[b]etween independent States, respect for 
territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations”. 82  Thus, 
sovereignty has always been, at least in part, grounded in the idea of territoriality and the 
extent of sovereign’s reach was usually decided by geographic borders,83 extending “to the 
internal waters and territorial sea of every State and to the air space above its territory”.84 
Hence, territoriality is not only an essential aspect of sovereignty, but also of the capacity of 
the State sovereignty. It refers to the supreme and full authority over certain territory, over its 
people to the exclusion of any other State. To take the myth-like character out of the notion, it 
is the “functional power possessed by a ruler or a government to rule a population for its own 
good”.85 Within the State, the sovereign power makes law with the assertion that it is supreme 
and ultimate. Its validity does not depend on any other higher authority and thus, it is often 
also called internal sovereignty, which allows State itself to determinate the order in that 
State. State’s exclusive right to decide on what acts shall take place on its territory has been 
generally “virtually undisputed”.86 
In inter-State relations, a sovereign State obeys no other authority.87 This notion is connected 
to the idea of independence, i.e. State’s legal position vis-à-vis other States.88 Permanent 
Court of International Justice (hereinafter PCIJ) held in the Lotus case that “restriction upon 
the independence of States […] cannot be presumed”.89 Moreover, in the case of S.S. 
Wimbeldon, the PCIJ held that restrictions placed upon the exercise of sovereignty “must be 
                                                
80 PCIJ. 07.09.1927. Case of S.S. Lotus (Turkey v. France). PCIJ Series A, No. 10, p 18-20; PCIJ. 07.07.1932. 
Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex. PCIJ Series A/B, No. 46, p 166–168. 
81 PCA. 04.04.1928. Island of Palmas case (Netherlands. v. US). Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. 
2, p 838. 
82 ICJ. Corfu Channel, para 202. 
83 R. Buchan. Cyber Attacks, p 222. 
84 ICJ. Nicaragua, para 212. 
85 M. Koskenniemi. What Use of Sovereignty Today, p 63. 
86 M. Koskenniemi. From Apology to Utopia, p 237. 
87 B. Simma et al. UN Charter Commentary, p 136. 
88 M. Koskenniemi. From Apology to Utopia, p 241. The idea of independece was also defined by the PCIJ in 
the Austro-German Customs Union Case, as “the continued existene of [a State – emphasis added LA] within 
her present frontiers as a separate State with the sole right of decision in all matters economic, political, financial 
or other”. PCIJ. 05.09.1931. Customs Regime Between Germany and Austria. Advisory Opinion. Series A/B 41, 
p 45. 
89 PCIJ. S.S. Lotus, p 18. 
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construed as restrictively as possible and confined within its narrowest limits”. 90  Yet, 
accepting treaty obligations is not regarded as a confinement of sovereignty, but rather an 
exercise of it. Being able to bind themselves under international treaties is an attribute of 
State’s sovereignty.91 The PCIJ made in the S.S. Wimbeldon case the distinction between the 
possession of sovereignty in abstracto and the exercise of sovereignty in concreto. Meaning, 
even if the State were stripped all of its attributes that belong to its notion of sovereignty, e.g. 
the power to conclude treaties, the State itself remains fully sovereign. As such, the S.S. 
Wimbeldon case broke ground: sovereignty was no longer an absolute phenomenon, but 
became relative, disaggregated phenomenon that encompasses a bundle of rights and 
obligations.92 Thus, when the PCIJ claimed in 1923 in the Nationality Decrees case that 
sovereignty is a “relative matter”,93 then it is not the concept of sovereignty itself that is 
relative, but the amount of rights and obligations that the State has at any given moment in 
international relations deriving from its exercise of sovereignty vis-à-vis other States. 
So, sovereignty does not merely afford protection but also imposes obligations on States, 
notably the “obligation to protect within the territory the rights of other States, in particular 
their right to integrity and inviolability in peace and in war, together with the rights which 
each State may claim for its nationals in foreign territory.”94 In essence, States have the 
obligation to recognise the sovereignty of other States, the obligation to follow the principle 
of non-intervention and the obligation to control the actions that occur within the sovereign’s 
geographic boundaries.95  
Besides the traditional legal notion, several other approaches have been proposed over time, 
which emphasise that the concept and practice of sovereignty are not always uniformly 
accepted. For example Stephen Krasner advocates for distinguishing between different forms 
of sovereignty that States can enjoy to a greater or a lesser degree. According to Krasner, the 
concept of sovereignty ought to embed three distinctive notions: international legal 
                                                
90 PCIJ. 17.08.1923. Case of the S.S. Wimbeldon. PCIJ Series A, No 1, p 24. 
91 B. Simma et al. UN Charter Commentary, p 138; PCIJ. S.S. Wimbeldon, p 25. 
92 J. Klabbers. Clinching to the concept of sovereignty: Wimbeldon redux. – Austrian Review of International 
and European Law 1999, Vol. 3, No. 3, p 362. 
93 PCIJ. 07.02.1923. Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (French Zone) on November 8th. 
Advisory Opinion. Series B04, p 23-24. M. Koskenniemi. From Apology to Utopia, pp 258-272. 
94 PCA. Island of Palmas, p 839. In his separate opinion in the Corfu Channel case, Judge Alvarez stated, “By 
sovereignty, we understand the whole body of rights and attributes which a State possesses in its territory, to the 
exclusion of all other States, and also in its relations with other States. Sovereignty confers rights upon States 
and imposes obligations upon them.” ICJ. Corfu Channel, separate opinion of Judge Alvarez, p 43. 
95 E.T. Jensen. Cyber Sovereignty, p 282. 
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sovereignty, domestic sovereignty and Westphalian or Vattelian sovereignty.96 International 
legal sovereignty flows from the concept of external sovereignty explained above. It entails 
international recognition of independent territorial entities, which implies the right to enter 
into any agreement the State chooses. Domestic sovereignty refers to the particular order how 
the public authority is organised and implemented within a State, i.e. effective control over 
the territory of the State including the ability to regulate trans-border movements. Lastly, the 
Westphalian sovereignty implies the obligation not to intervene in the internal affairs of other 
sovereign States. It signifies the absence of submission to external authority structures.97 
According to Krasner, all three of these forms are distinct and do not form an organic whole. 
The elements of sovereignty have also not been conjoined in practice.98 Krasner’s theory, 
while at times radical, emphasises excellently, how sovereignty in essence has different 
angles that need to be considered. It exemplifies that sovereignty is not monolithic, but can be 
considered rather a “sponge concept” that can manifest itself in different forms.99  
Thirdly, Nicholas Tsagourias proposes that it is important to disentangle sovereignty as a 
concept from the notion of territory, as territory as an element of sovereignty is a “lego-
political construct”, which aims at organising space for political or legal purposes.100 As such 
State’s territory is not only the object, but also the container of sovereignty, as it draws State’s 
legal and political borders. With his approach, Tsagourias distances himself from the 
traditionally accepted concept of sovereignty. He explains that “whereas sovereignty as 
summa potestas is unbounded, territory localises sovereignty”101 and acts as the “constraint 
that unravels the assertion of unconstrained sovereignty”.102 Seeing sovereignty bound to one 
territory on which it is exercised, can be considered a political act, which is a result of a 
political process and successful assertions of power. According to Tsagourias, there is no 
inherent nexus between territory and sovereignty. Territory offers a tangible space, where 
sovereignty can manifest itself in political and legal terms. Thus, sovereignty could extend 
                                                
96 In his earlier work “Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy” (1999) Krasner distinguishes four forms, adding 
interdependence sovereignty, however, in his later works, he has excluded the form focuses on the three main 
ones as mentioned above. S.D. Krasner. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, pp 9-25. Cf. S.D. Krasner. The Hole 
in the Whole: Sovereignty, Shared Sovereignty, and International Law. – Michigan Journal of International Law 
2004, Vol. 25, p 1077; S.D. Krasner. The durability of organized hypocrisy. – H. Kalmo, Q. Skinner (eds.). 
Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept. Oxford: OUP 2010, p 96. 
97 S.D. Krasner. The Hole in the Whole, p 1077. S.D. Krasner. The durability of organized hypocrisy, p 96. 
98 S.D. Krasner. The durability of organized hypocrisy, p 97.  
99 J. Bartelson. A Geneology of Sovereignty. Cambridge: CUP 1993, p 26. 
100 N. Tsagourias. Legal Status of Cyberspace, p 18. 
101 Ibid, p 17. 
102 J.P. Trachman. Cyberspace, sovereignty, jurisdiction and modernism. – Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies 1998, Vol. 5, Iss. 2, p 567. 
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beyond any allocated territory and also to non-territorial entities.103 Even though novel, 
Tsagourias’ view leaves unclear where the extent of one State’s sovereignty ends and another 
one’s begins. That would also challenge the application of multiple principles deriving from 
the concept of sovereignty, e.g. the principle of non-intervention. 
The present thesis adopts the first and most traditional legal view of sovereignty, with the 
addition of taking into account the political sensitivities that accompany the notion. 
Sovereignty implies on the on the one hand the monopoly of the governing authority within 
the state, which is generally seen as exclusive. On the other hand, it implies relations between 
the States, where each State is externally independent and where the amount of rights and 
obligations may vary as a result of exercises of sovereignty by the State.  
2.2. Is sovereignty withering away? 
For various reasons a considerable amount of works on the erosion, loss, waning, withering of 
sovereignty, or on its decline, retreat or apparent death have been produced by scholars.104 
Argument can be made that sovereignty in general accounts for less in today’s world. After 
all, States have used sovereignty to limit sovereignty to a great extent through voluntarily 
binding themselves with an increasingly dense network of formal and informal rules and 
regimes.105 However, that is not to say it counts as a derogation or loss of sovereignty: States 
have been able to bind themselves, because they are sovereigns.106 States have tamed down 
sovereignty through exercising sovereignty. As an organized hypocrisy it “upholds egoistic 
interests of limited communities against the world at large, providing unlimited opportunities 
for oppression at home.”107 We have observed its failure to deal with global threats, while 
obstructing global beneficial cooperation. Instead of a “narrow, ethnocentric way to think 
about the relations of human beings,”108 in several fields global approaches have become 
prevalent, which cross the “artificial national boundaries”.109 Not to mention threats that have 
                                                
103 N. Tsagourias. Legal Status of Cyberspace, p 18. 
104 For example, E. Lauterpacht. Sovereignty – Myth or Reality? – International Affairs 1997, Vol. 73, No. 1; C. 
Schreuer. The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for International Law. – European 
Journal of International Law 1993, Vol. 4; T.G. Weiss, J. Chopra. Sovereignty under Siege: From Intervention to 
Humanitarian Space. – G.M. Lyons, M. Mastanduno (eds.). Beyond Westphalia?: State Sovereignty and 
International Intervention. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1995; J.A. Camilleri, J. Falk. The End of 
Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World. – Foreign Affairs Fall 1992, 
www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/1992-09-01/end-sovereignty-politics-shrinking-and-
fragmenting-world (visited 01.04.2016). 
105 M. Koskenniemi. What Use for Sovereignty Today, p 62. 
106 Ibid; PCIJ. S.S. Wimbeldon, p 25. 
107 M. Koskenniemi. What Use for Sovereignty Today, p 61. 
108 Ibid, p 62. 
109 Ibid; M. Koskenniemi. The Wonderful Artificiality of States. – American Society of International Law 
Proceedings 1994, Vol. 88, pp 22–29. 
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become not only cross-border but also global, influencing interdependent system of States 
more than ever through inter-connectedness of networks and information infrastructure. Thus, 
at first glance “[t]o suggest that there might be good use for state sovereignty sounds counter-
intuitive,”110 even more so in the context of cyberspace. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the concept of sovereignty should be abandoned from 
the vocabulary of international law completely. Reason being that not only is its meaning 
confusing, its uses various, but some of those uses are unworthy, some destructive of human 
values.111 Predictions of the demise of State sovereignty due to interdependence have surfaced 
then and again throughout the 20th century. For example, the former US Secretary of State 
Robert Lansing opined in the beginning of 1920s that world sovereignty would become a 
reality in the practice of States due to interdependence among States.112 Similarly, Georg 
Schwarzenberger, a distinguished international law scholar of the 20th century, noted that it is 
fashionable to argue that independence is giving way to interdependence on the international 
level, however, that might just seem so at the first glance.113  
Thus, before declaring the concept of sovereignty dead and moving on in an unorganized 
hypocrisy, what perhaps is needed is an understanding of its realisation on the most varied 
fields of international conduct.114 States are still free to exercise their sovereignty – protection 
of their interest practically requires it.115 If States have pooled, shared, delimited or delegated 
away some of their powers through treaties and participation in various international 
organisations and venues, they can always take back the powers that they have previously 
negotiated away,116 since that is also a sovereign prerogative. If a State’s capacity to act on a 
domestic as well as on the international level is usually referred to as sovereignty, there is no 
reason to speak about the demise of sovereignty. Regardless of the particular philosophy of 
sovereignty one follows, sovereignty has had and continues to have an important role in the 
development of international law as well as the concept of the State. Thus, the present work 
continues with the approach that focuses on the concept of sovereignty as well as the exercise 
thereof.  
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Another criticism is that States do not own the monopoly of governing authority. According 
to the functional view, States lose their normative priority and compete with supranational, 
private and local actors for the allocation of regulatory authority. If one were to discard the 
concept of sovereignty, Benedict Kingsbury argues, it would only intensify the inequality, 
weaken the restraints on coercive intervention and diminish the critical roles of the State in 
the international system.117  
Much of the debate surrounding sovereignty in recent decades has been binary: States’ 
sovereignty is or is not disappearing. Supranational organisations and inter-connectedness are 
apparently turning States into only half-sovereigns, 118  global problems challenge State 
sovereignty since they need global solutions. As Antonio Cassese notes, “we are dealing at 
the moment with a substantial alteration of the modes of exercising the sovereignty of States, 
rather than the real decline of it.”119 One should not forget, how and by whom decision-
making power is actually exercised within the supranational institutions.120 Those who really 
decide on the supranational level, e.g. in the UN, are States. Global problems find solutions 
still among States. If States in need decide to include the private sector, they are not giving 
part of their sovereignty away, instead, they are making a sovereign decision to cooperate 
with the private sector and that is exercise of State sovereignty. Thus, if there is a crisis in 
sight, it is a crisis of a particular mode of exercising State sovereignty that has grown to be 
accustomed to be connected with States. Sovereignty has never been an absolute but an 
aggregation of power subject to different degrees of sovereign control. No single description 
of State sovereignty at any given point is likely to satisfy the inquiry, since the set of 
attributes that defines a State and its sovereignty changes through time and varies with the 
State in question.121 Sovereignty is not a monolith, thus it would be wise to move away from 
the dichotomies and focus on how States are actually exercising their sovereignty and the 
flexibility that States are creating within the concept of sovereignty. Therefore, the present 
work will turn its focus on how sovereignty is applied.  
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3. Sovereignty in cyberspace – a necessary oxymoron 
Cyber operations challenge the traditional concept of sovereignty. At a first glance, 
sovereignty seems to have morphed in the present context into something formalistic, with no 
real meaning – something that can be easily breached without any following consequences. 
However, this is not a recent development. The impact of information technology on the 
power of sovereign States was recognised already in the 1990s.122 Many premised that the 
Information Age would lead to the ‘demise of the nation-state through the erosion of state 
power and, as a result, state sovereignty’.123 Alf Ross opined that there is hardly any domain, 
in which the obscurity and confusion are as great as when it comes to sovereignty.124 Adding 
to the notion the ambiguity of the cyber domain, the effect is multiplied. 
Cyberspace does not abide State boundaries, as it is inherently a cross-border construct. The 
interdependent global information infrastructure, consisting inter alia of submarine cables, 
satellites, telecommunication networks etc., and the resident data flowing in the networks 
challenge the traditional notions of territory. One cannot easily establish physical State 
boundaries or mark a certain territory as one’s own, for it is a connected web of infrastructure 
and architecture that often relies on several actors cooperating. Here, the questions about the 
relevance of sovereignty in the 21st century once again emerge. The doubts, whether 
cyberspace could be immune from State sovereignty, fears of anarchy in cyberspace, 
considerations of interpreting cyberspace as a global commons – all these questions have been 
prevalent in the scholarly works.125  
The following chapter looks at sovereignty in cyberspace from three different angles. As the 
sovereignty debate may be divided into phases of cyber libertarianism, considering 
cyberspace as global commons and thirdly, trying to reconcile the general notion of 
sovereignty and territory with a largely intangible space, the following chapter gives an 
overview of the development of the modern sovereignty in cyberspace.  
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3.1. Cyber libertarianism: Cyberspace as a law-free zone 
Not long ago, cyberspace was described as a Wild West,126 where no State would be able to 
exercise territorial control and drawing a connection between cyberspace and sovereignty 
seemed more of an oxymoron than reality. The early views of cyberspace were largely 
primitive and still trying to grasp the complexity of the cyberspace. The belief that cyberspace 
ought to be free from State interference led to the misconception or “utopia” that cyberspace 
is immune from State sovereignty. 127  Online freedom activists, sometimes also called 
cyberlibertarians, saw cyberspace as free from regulatory intervention already in 1990s, when 
John Perry Barlow stated in A Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace that, 
“Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from 
Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to 
leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we 
gather.”128 
Barlow’s famous manifesto declared cyberspace immune from territorial sovereignty of 
nation States, influenced by the second half of the cyberlibertarian thought, which comes 
from David Post and David Johnson, whose paper “Law and Borders – The Rise of Law in 
Cyberspace”, made the point that cyberspace not only cannot be subjected to sovereignty, but 
instead it should be subject to its own distinct legal regulation, which would be based on self-
regulation.129 Their no-sovereignty thesis, founded on the concept of cyber-exceptionalism,130 
reflected that the open, decentralised and participatory space ought to not be hampered by 
legal regulations imposed by States.131 After all, cyberspace is different from real spaces by 
being a-territorial, borderless and ubiquitous in character. As such, it differentiates from 
physical and bounded spaces or domains that are currently subject to legal regulation.132 They 
claimed that “the Net radically subverts a system of rule-making based on borders between 
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physical spaces”.133 Cyberspace itself undermined the ability for a State to assert de facto 
jurisdiction over online activities. Thus, cyberspace should be a separate legal jurisdiction 
from the “real world”. Whereas traditional State sovereignty is based on notions of physical 
borders, it cannot effectively function in cyberspace. Individuals and different actors can 
move effortlessly between zones that are governed by different regimes, choosing one they 
wish.134 Moreover, the sovereignty’s principles of validity – power, legitimacy, effects, notice 
– which are generally exhibited in territorial entities, were considered impossible or at best 
diluted when it comes to cyberspace.135 Since Internet, in Johnson and Post’s mind did not 
recognise existing physical borders, it was not falling under State’s authority, whose 
sovereignty was confined to one territory, separated from others by boundaries.136 Thus, the 
rules for governing said space would have derived from the generative community that uses 
cyberspace, not from externally imposed laws from nation States.137 
Barlow took the argument further, noting that not only is it impossible to impose external 
legal controls in cyberspace, because de facto authority cannot be imposed on an intangible, 
borderless space, but any such attempt to exercise sovereignty therein would lack legitimacy, 
since there is no recognised law-making authority for said space. From the latter argument, 
the historical perspective of mid-1990s shines through, when cyberspace was much less 
regulated space and movements to regulate online activities were in their infancy.138 
Jack Goldsmith presented soon after an opposite view to cyberlibertarians. He claimed that 
their view was infected by three particular fallacies, which would undermine their arguments. 
Firstly, the fallacy that cyberspace was a separate space. Secondly, that territorially bound 
governments cannot regulate the non-territorial cyberspace. Thirdly, he claimed that there is 
over-optimism that there will be cheap and plentiful information.139 Essentially, Goldsmith 
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made the point that actors in cyberspace are not removed from our world and thus, he 
understood cyberspace more like a communications media rather than a physical space. For 
Goldsmith, cyberspace is an extension of a pre-existing communications media and there is 
no distinction needed between space and cyberspace.140 As a communication media, similarly 
to telephone and other communications equipment, which all have real-world existence and 
are located at least partly in one of physical world legal jurisdictions, cyberspace activities are 
undertaken from within sovereign jurisdictions,141 where States can effectively regulate said 
activities.  
Even though Goldsmith’s view was a more realistic than cyberlibertarians’ one, it did not 
count for the exponentially increasing extent of cyberspace activity States would have to 
consider in the next decade. At the same time, States started to realise the immense potential 
of ICTs. Russia was the first one to express its concerns about the information weapons and 
the threat of information wars already in 1998, emphasising the importance of sovereignty in 
the fight against such arms race.142 Soon, after Russia’s initiative, States started to grasp that 
the global, largely intangible, conceptual element of cyberspace clearly differs from the 
traditional spaces onto which the principle of sovereignty is usually applied, i.e. land, sea, air 
and space.143 
Whether or not cyberspace is a subject to international law is to a great extent not disputable 
anymore. As will be explained below, the UN GGE affirmed the applicability of existing 
international law, especially the UN Charter, to cyberspace with its 2013 Report.144 Thus, the 
cyberlibertarian view of cyberspace as a non-legal domain, even though noble, has been in the 
practice overturned for a more traditional view of State sovereignty and its applicability to 
cyberspace. 
3.2. Common misconception: cyberspace as a global commons 
Lawyers love to reason by analogy, but as Brown puts it “analogies fail us in cyber 
operations.”145 Due to the differences of cyberspace from any other physical domain, most 
attempts to draw analogies are bound to fail. Even though cyberspace is a unique manmade 
formation, one of the suggestions often made is that cyberspace is part of the global commons 
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similar to natural domains such as air,146 international waters147 and space,148 i.e. not a non-
legal domain, but rather a resource belonging to everyone and subject to appropriation by no 
one, characterised by collective governance autonomous from the territorial sovereignty 
model.149 US Department of Defence (hereinafter DoD) seemingly followed the analogy 
stating that “the global common consists of international waters and airspace, space and 
cyberspace,”150 yet has by now abandoned the view. NATO claimed the same, stating that 
“The Global Commons comprise four domains: maritime, air, space and cyber.”151 However, 
there is no universally accepted definition regarding “global commons”. Depending on the 
bias added by different actors, the definition provided is slightly different in each case. Most 
definitions that have been provided, however, share one common trait: they focus on natural 
resources that cannot be fully appropriated and are not under the control of one specific 
State.152 
It is widely held that cyberspace “is not a physical place – it defies measurement in any 
physical dimension or time space continuum. It is a short-hand term that refers to the 
environment created by the confluence of co-operative networks of computers, information 
systems, and telecommunication infrastructures.”153 It is also characterised by anonymity and 
ubiquity.154 Thus using high seas, international airspace or outer space as an analogy155 seems 
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tempting. Yet, the proposals to ground the regulation of cyberspace in the regulation of the 
rest of the global commons have failed to gather widespread support.156 
Even though cyberspace shares some traits that are similar to the global commons, e.g. no one 
sovereign could assert authority over it, the lack of physical boundaries per se does not make 
it a global commons. Patrick W. Franzese has proposed that all existing global commons 
share five similarities, offering thereby a litmus test for cyberspace. 
“First, a global commons has a governing international treaty. Second, this treaty 
provides specific permissible uses and prohibitions of that global commons. Third, the 
global commons has boundaries and is definable. Fourth, nations have agreed to forgo, 
or at least leave unasserted […], claims of exclusive sovereignty over any portion of the 
global commons. Finally, no single state is capable of controlling the global commons. 
In other words, a global commons is not the absence of sovereignty but rather the 
presence of a shared global sovereignty.’157, 158 
When trying to apply this test, it becomes clear that the characteristics are not applicable to 
cyberspace. It is not fully intangible, it rests on a man-made physical and clearly tangible 
construct159 and uses all other global commons to function. For example, submarine cables 
are often laid across the high seas between Europe and the US. Wireless networks send 
signals through the air. Cyberspace has a physical technical infrastructure that is owned by 
States or private entities and is located in their territory, which is under State’s sovereign 
control. There is no moment when bits, data or information moving from one computer to 
another are not on a network that someone owns, be it the State or the private sector, and that 
is physically located in a sovereign state. The sole exceptions might be undersea cables or 
satellite transmissions; however, the action still takes place on an owned facility where the 
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owner is subject to some country and its laws.160 Thus, besides the physical information 
infrastructure, there are no accepted boundaries in cyberspace.161 Pointing at cyberspace will 
be a daunting task for any actor in the field. Furthermore, the mere fact that part of cyberspace 
is intangible does not mean States have waivered their claims of sovereignty in that space. 
Similarly, if States have not chosen to assert sovereign control in the given domain or are not 
capable of doing so due to lack of capabilities or digital divide, it does not mean cyberspace is 
not or could not be covered by sovereignty. Lastly, there are no common rules established, 
since States cannot reach a consensus on the core questions, one of them being sovereignty. 
Similarly, there is no treaty governing the domain and States have not agreed on permissible 
and prohibited uses of cyberspace. The work done by the three UN GGE’s in 2010, 2013 and 
2015 aims at establishing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace, yet is largely political 
and States have shown no interest in designating cyberspace as a global commons. Essentially 
the Group has not established any effectively enforceable rules for governing cyberspace (UN 
GGE work is elaborated in Chapter 4.2.1.). 
If cyberspace were to be considered a global commons, it would clearly not only distort the 
essence of real global commons and discount the role of States in governing them162 but also 
undercut national and international security. Given the growing level of State interests and the 
search for technical and policy solutions to extend their control in cyberspace, an 
interpretation where no State can claim and protect their sovereignty in cyberspace is not 
feasible. It would lead to a situation, where no amount of interference within cyberspace 
would amount to an intervention,163 taking effectively away the opportunity of States to 
protect themselves and assert their rights under international law. Thus, it is a general 
consensus that sovereignty applies to cyberspace164 and the current thesis adopts this view 
going forward. 
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3.3. Cyberspace and territorial sovereignty 
Sovereignty is considered a cornerstone of international law and international politics. Yet, 
the meaning of the term has provided a topic of debate for centuries165 and is contested once 
again in the context of cyberspace.166 Walter B. Wriston predicted in the end of 1980s that 
new technology would eventually rewrite old concepts of sovereignty as well as change 
national objectives. However, the shift in the power structure seen in the 1980s167 was not a 
novelty but just another wave of change brought about technology’s impact on State-on-State 
relations, altering the balance of power between States.168 
As discussed, cyberspace is not considered a global commons as if now.169 Thus, States are 
and will remain sovereign even in cyberspace, where there is de facto nor physical territory 
nor a tangible domain. Some scholars are of the opinion that a definition of sovereignty 
grounded in territory is ill suited for discussions surrounding cyberspace and cyber 
operations,170 however, that is not necessarily so. Essentially, sovereignty in cyberspace, or as 
some call it “cyber sovereignty”, is the extension of territorial sovereignty.171 Taking into 
consideration the architecture and infrastructure of cyberspace, it becomes clear that States 
may de facto effectively exercise sovereign control over the information infrastructure 
physically located in its sovereign territory and activities originating therefrom. The State or 
corporations own the terrestrial, underwater and outer space infrastructure.172 At the same 
time, it might be difficult to exercise sovereignty with regard to information architecture due 
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to its intangible nature.173 Another controversial question is data sovereignty, i.e. to what 
extent can States control the flow of the data both within and across their borders, taking into 
account that it prevents the productive and efficient use of the Internet for users. 174 
Technically, States can exercise jurisdiction over data and information that is circulated 
around cyberspace and networks at the point of delivery and the point of reception or when 
information crosses through infrastructure that falls within its territory.175 
While all previously mentioned does not mean that any State may claim sovereignty over the 
entirety of cyberspace per se, States can exercise control over the infrastructure, i.e. physical 
components, situated in their “land territory, internal waters, territorial sea, archipelagic 
waters, or national airspace”.176 Furthermore, whilst the infrastructure is inherently part of the 
global Internet, a State will not thereby waiver its right to exercise jurisdictional or sovereign 
authority over the infrastructure.177 Even though cyberspace definitely challenges States’ 
ability to technically control trans-border movements, deriving from the notion of 
sovereignty, States can control access and egress from their territory and according to Wolff 
Heintschel von Heinegg that also applies to all forms of communications.178 Moreover, States, 
for example the USA, have continuously emphasised their right to exercise control over and 
protect their information infrastructure against trans-border interference and assert authority 
over cyber activities on their territory.179 Therefore, as cyberspace has a physical as well as a 
virtual component, where activities do not always manifest in physical world, they still have 
real effects on other spaces, humans and institutions.180 Thus, States can exercise jurisdiction 
within their territory over cyber infrastructure located on its territory and over cyber activities 
that have been engaged in thereon.  
Another important implication of territorial sovereignty in the context of cyberspace is its 
relative nature, which aims to protect the territorial sovereignty and integrity of other States. 
As stated by PCA already in in the beginning of the 20th century, sovereignty embodies rights 
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as well as responsibilities, especially the “obligation to protect within the territory the rights 
of other States, in particular their right to integrity and inviolability in peace and in war.”181 
Relative nature, as was implied by the PCIJ, suggests that the extent of international rights 
and obligations is different State by State, depending on its international relations. The same 
was affirmed in the separate opinion of Judge Alvarez in the Corfu Channel case in 1949, 
where he stated, “By sovereignty, we understand the whole body of rights and attributes 
which a State possesses in its territory, to the exclusion of all other States, and also in its 
relations with other States. Sovereignty confers rights upon States and imposes obligations on 
them”.182 Thus, territorial sovereignty does not mean only the right to exercise control over a 
certain territory, but includes also as a corollary principle the respect for territorial integrity, 
i.e. the right to be free from interference and the duty to avoid interference with another 
State’s territory.183 When sovereignty has been established, States that are exercising their 
authority in cyberspace are on the one hand entitled to be free from intervention but on the 
other hand, must prevent possible breaches of another State’s territorial integrity originating 
from its territory. Therefore, States must accept the obligations that come with the assertion of 
that authority. Besides the actual effective control over certain territory and the right to be free 
from interference, territorial sovereignty includes also political independence of a State, 
which ought to allow the State to pursue economic, social and cultural development without 
coercion.184 
While it is clear that there is no possibility to establish a fixed limit of sovereignty based on 
States’ capabilities, such as the original three-mile limit of the territorial sea,185 cyberspace is 
more territorial than probably thought, whilst still maintaining its non-territorial 
characteristics. The partly intangible nature does not restrict States from exercising sovereign 
control over the infrastructure located in their territory and that has two distinct implications. 
Firstly, the cyber infrastructure located in the State is subject to legal and regulatory control 
by the State. Secondly, regardless of whether the infrastructure is owned by the government 
or private entities, protection deriving from State’s territorial sovereignty protects such 
infrastructure from interference by other States.186 The opponents of applying the concept of 
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territorial sovereignty to cyberspace often note that it is such a different space from all known 
natural spaces that it would need its own regulation.187 The argument could be made that old 
laws cannot protect, provide for the effective management and restrict abusive uses in this 
man-made domain. However, as Judge Alvarez noted already in 1949, exercising and 
asserting sovereignty can take different forms in different spheres.188 As such, sovereignty is a 
bundle of rights and obligations that allows for interpretative elasticity, and can therefore, be 
applied in the context of new technologies. The UN GGE 2013 Report supported the view by 
concluding that State sovereignty and international norms and principles that flow from 
sovereignty, apply to State conduct of ICT-related activities and to jurisdiction over ICT 
infrastructure within a State’s territory.189 
If one were to ask a Koskenniemi-esque question, “What is the use of sovereignty today in 
cyberspace?”190 the answer would be two-fold. On the one hand, cyberspace has provided 
States an additional domain where to conduct their defensive and offensive activities, develop 
strategic capabilities as well as compete, leading to States having a valid interest in exercising 
control in cyberspace. Sovereign equality offers States the freedom to do as they choose. Each 
State is free to develop or not to develop their cyber capabilities according to their resources 
and interests. However, everyone has the opportunity to do so, thus realising the principle of 
sovereign equality. At the same time, sovereignty offers boundaries that otherwise would be 
lost in a partly intangible domain, protecting States from unlawful interferences and providing 
remedies if breached. However, as Gary D. Brown notes, “[p]owerful cyber nations do what 
they can to defend their own Internet infrastructures, with some success. Weaker nations 
suffer what they must in cyberspace. Victim nations are often, undoubtedly, never even know 
their Internet infrastructure is being used for foreign espionage or as a staging point for cyber 
criminals, hacktivists and foreign government actors.”191 Even though we are unable to set 
physical boundaries to sovereignty, putting it that way illustrates that cyber sovereignty 
“extends exactly as far as each country can make it”.192 
On the other hand, as cyberspace can be considered increasingly Hobbesian, sovereignty and 
State control offer somewhat of a stability needed in such a domain. The original vision 
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presented by the online freedom activists and cyberlibertarians decades ago, where 
cyberspace ought to be free from State and regulatory intervention, is not sustainable taking 
into account the exponentially growing amount of activities undertaken in said space. Simply 
put, it would lead to a chaos. Waiting for a social contract to form between all the different 
actors conducting activities in cyberspace without State interference is either not feasible at 
all or takes a very long time to form.193 Lengthy non-regulation, however, would have serious 
implications for international and national security. At the same time, it would be naïve to 
hope that States as the main actors in the international system would relinquish their claims in 
a domain, where strategic advantage could benefit the State on multiple levels. Thus, it is apt 
to point out that the reports of “the death of sovereignty are much exaggerated: not only is the 
state free to exercise its sovereignty, the protection of its interests practically requires it.”194 It 
is thus the concept of sovereignty and the principles deriving therefrom that are the 
foundation for determining the legality of the conduct of States in cyberspace.  
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4. Exercising sovereignty in cyberspace 
While it has been claimed that the limits to the sovereignty of States are increasingly growing 
in quantity and in depth,195 cybersecurity and national security may be considered few of the 
areas, where traditional notions of sovereignty are soaring and blossoming. Academics and 
experts alike focus mostly on whether sovereignty as a concept applies to cyberspace in the 
first place.196 In parallel, as will be explained, States are already exercising sovereignty in 
cyberspace for their benefit without having agreed upon the rules for the “game”, i.e. how 
international law applies in cyberspace. In order to provide legal certainty and clarity, it is of 
outmost importance to analyse how States exercise sovereignty in cyberspace.  
The State practice shows that States are exercising their sovereign rights in the domestic level 
through their exclusive jurisdiction as well as in international in normative discussions 
pertaining to cyberspace. Furthermore, States can make the sovereign decision of non-
compliance, i.e. decide to not respect the sovereignty of other States. International law at the 
hands of scholars look different than international law in the hands of States.197 Low-intensity 
cyber operations have offered States who have the appropriate capabilities the loophole they 
need to exert power and achieve their strategic or tactical goals without crossing the threshold 
of the use of force according to the UN Charter Article 2(4). What are considered below the 
threshold breaches of sovereignty and how does the principle of non-intervention apply to 
offensive cyber operations conducted by States has not as of date been agreed upon, which 
reflects also in the State practice.198 The unclear legal regulations and States’ growing 
capabilities in a highly contested environment create perfect conditions for an organised 
hypocrisy, where long-standing established rules have been ignored numerous times. 
The legal concept of sovereignty cannot be divided from the power politics. Although there 
are some, who argue that “sovereignty is essentially a political and not a legal concept”.199 
Others contest the view by contending that “sovereignty is essentially a political and not a 
                                                
195 L. Condorelli, A. Cassese. Referenced work, p 14. 
196 For example, P.W. Franzese. Referenced work.  
197  E. Tikk-Ringas. Presentation at UNIDIR International Security Cyber Issues Workshop Series: The 
Application of International Law in the Context of International Cybersecurity. – 19-21.04.2016, 
www.unidir.org/programmes/emerging-security-threats/international-security-cyber-issues-workshop-
series/international-security-cyber-issues-workshop-series-the-application-of-international-law-in-the-context-
of-international-cybersecurity (visited 25.04.2016). 
198 Cyber Policy Institute. State Practice and International Law in Cyberspace: A Study of Major Cyber Incidents 
and Applicable Law. – forthcoming at the Conference on State Practice and the Future of International Law in 
Cyberspace, 05.05.2016. 
199 G. Leibholz. Sovereignty and European Integration: Some Basic Considerations. – G. Leibholz (ed.). Politics 
and Law. Leiden: Sijthoff 1965, p 217. 
 37 
legal concept”. 200  Policy considerations are an integral part of the international legal 
process201 and the exercise of sovereignty can be highly political, strategic and calculated. 
States are not only free to exercise their sovereignty, but protecting and promoting their 
interests in the cyber discourse requires it. As sovereignty is “the very guarantor of the 
unstable union of politics and law”,202 the present chapter analyses is based on State practice, 
how States exercise their sovereign rights in cyberspace. 
4.1. Internal sovereignty 
As a general rule, States assert legal authority regularly over actors and activities taking place 
in cyberspace within the confines of their territory. States can exercise jurisdiction based on 
the physical location of the networks or servers employed or the physical location where the 
effects of the activity occur.203 
However, exercising sovereignty vis-à-vis cyberspace is in different stages of maturity among 
States. Some, as is the case of certain States in Africa, are only developing the necessary local 
physical infrastructure to be connected to the global network of networks. Even if such 
infrastructure exists, maintaining its security has proven to be a challenge to a number of 
States. Different levels of maturity in the field will likely be the trend also in the future. 
However, when it comes to power players in the field, their exercise of exclusive jurisdiction 
is carried by two different ideologies among the major cyber powers – the US, Russia, and 
China. From liberal to more restrictive, the exercise of sovereignty in cyberspace is often 
characterised by multi-polarisation among respective powers. 
The US is generally the proponent of a more open, cooperative system without strict borders 
that would reflect in cyberspace per se. Adopting a more liberal approach, the US is 
committed to an “open, secure, interoperable, and reliable Internet that enables prosperity, 
public safety, and the free flow of commerce and ideas”.204 Carried by its hegemonic nature 
and possibly the aspiration to expand its cyber sovereignty, the US promotes a global and 
open cyberspace, where multiple stakeholders participate in governance issues without 
content restrictions. 205  US, as one of the founding States of the global information 
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infrastructure,206 has shown high adaptability to the changes brought about by the fast 
development of technology. In the light of their “new normal” doctrine, put forward by 
Michael Daniel, the special assistant to the president and White House cybersecurity 
coordinator, their political approach recognises that persistent intrusions, violations of 
privacy, thefts of business information and denial of service on multiple levels is the reality 
that every actor must endure.207  
As polar opposites, Russia and China, who are emphasising sovereignty as the greatest value 
in the international system and the foundational principle of international law,208 are firm 
believers in the fact that the State alone can and should control access and egress from State’s 
territory. Aspirations of establishing a cyber-Westphalia are in this context not exaggerations. 
Both of the States are in the process of asserting their technological sovereignty by designing 
“national Internets”, which are connected to the rest of the world only in protected and 
channelled ways209, 210 allowing the State to control the connection as well as the content.211 
By defining a “.ru” internal network or “internal cyberspace” only open to Russian citizens212 
Russia effectively tries to ensure their interests by exerting maximum possible control. Even 
though it has made efforts to reduce the dependence on foreign suppliers,213 the technology 
that Russia uses is still similar to that used by many other States, the logical layers of it will 
be adapted to allow the control the State needs through filtering, permitting or blocking what 
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the State defines as its prerogatives.214 As such, Russia is trying to enact rules of data 
sovereignty and residency, which would allow firstly, to apply government control over all 
data collected within a country and secondly, to establish a mandatory data storage location 
and efficiently contain data flow within its borders.215 First steps towards the restrictive data 
flows have already been made. In July 2014 Russia passed a law coming to force in 
September 2016 mandating that cloud-service providers engaging in business in Russia must 
hold the data they collect in databases located within the territory of the Russian 
Federation.216 It is believed to be a response to the June 2013 Edward Snowden revelations, 
when classified information about US government’s global surveillance programs was leaked, 
making States, among others also Brazil, 217  reconsider or strengthen their position on 
sovereignty in cyberspace and especially data sovereignty.218  
Similarly, China puts forward that every State should be able to independently choose their 
own path of cyber development, model of cyber regulation and Internet public policies,219 
which is consistent with their foreign policy approach deriving from the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence.220 The principles emphasise very strongly respect for State sovereignty 
and the right to make decisions as a State without outside interference or scrutiny. Thus, their 
latest security bill calls for the protection of cyber sovereignty,221 which includes also purging 
most foreign technology from critical infrastructure, such as banks and military, but also from 
State-owner enterprises.222 Free flow of information should be guaranteed under the premises 
that national sovereignty as well as security is safeguarded.223 To that extent, Chinese 
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government has controlled domestic access to content on the Internet since 2003 through the 
Great Firewall of China.224 Through filtering Internet traffic through eight gateways that 
connect the Chinese Internet to the global Internet and configuring Internet routers at those 
gateways to block certain website addresses and keywords, the Chinese government 
effectively prevents information from entering China that it deems threatening to its own 
regime.225 For example, China has banned since 2009 until present Twitter, all Google sites 
and platforms, including Youtube and Facebook226 as a response to political protest after 
which private sector actors, such as Google, refused to cooperate with the government in its 
efforts to censor search results.227 It goes to show that States, such as China,228 are asserting 
their sovereign right to control what takes place within their territory quite aggressively, 
interpreting the right of States to control access and egress from its territory as broadly as 
possible, which is mostly at odds with the concept of freedom of information.  
Juxtaposed to the US approach, Russia as well as China prefer to exercise sovereignty in 
cyberspace rather defensively and restrictively. Since they are not at the level of technological 
sophistication and performance that the US technological supremacy in the field shows, the 
restrictive approach allows both States to create national and pursue for international 
normative environments that promote their views and aspirations. By retaining the possibility 
to disconnect from the global network and filter the content as deemed necessary, both States 
are effectively fighting one of their greatest online threats – internal dissident and anti-
government writings disseminated on the Internet – through censoring information and 
limiting access to the Internet.229 However, China and Russia are not the only ones to use 
Internet bans to curb the mushrooming of dissent within the country. Several States, for 
example Turkey, North Korea, Vietnam, Libya, Pakistan, Egypt, Iran, Syria, Iraq, Congo, 
Bangladesh230 have banned certain services for a shorter or a longer period of time for 
                                                
224 X. Qiang. How China’s Internet Police Control Speech on the Internet. – Radio Free Asia, 24.11.2008, 
www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/china_internet-11242008134108.html (visited 20.04.2016). 
225 M.C. Libicki. Crisis and Escalation in Cyberspace. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 2012, p 100. C. 
Lotrionte. State Sovereignty and Self-Defense in Cyberspace: A Normative Framework for Balancing Legal 
Rights. – Emory International Law Review 2012, Vol. 26, p 846. 
226 D. Liebelson. Map: Here are the Countries the Block Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube. – 28.03.2014, 
www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/03/turkey-facebook-youtube-twitter-blocked (visited 20.04.2016). See also 
Google Transparency Report. Recent and ongoing disruptions of traffic to Google products. – 
www..google.com/transparencyreport/traffic/#expand=CG (visited 20.04.2016). 
227 C. Lotrionte. State Sovereignty, p 848. 
228 For a broader discussion on Chinese views on cybersecurity, see, J.R. Lindsay, T.M. Cheung, D.S. Reveron. 
China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain. Oxford: OUP 2015. 
229 C. Lotrionte. State sovereignty, p 847. Generally for an overview of the practice of global Internet filtering, 
see, R. Deibert, J. Palfrey, R. Rohozinski, J. Zittrain. Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet 
Filtering. Cambridge: MIT Press 2008. 
230 Cyber Policy Institute. Table: Internet Bans. – 20.04.2016. 
 41 
numerous political reasons, such as curbing the dissemination of opposition views ahead of 
elections or taming protest.231 Technology, freedom of information and social media enable 
the widespread dissemination of dissenting ideas.232 The most prominent example would be 
during the so called Arab Spring, where dissident groups used social media to coordinate their 
activities and Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Cameroon, and Malawi reacted with a social media 
ban.233  
For other countries, the monopoly of control, autonomy and even “territoriality” rest in using 
and relying on indigenous technologies. For Germany, the importance of relying on German-
only technologies reflects a form of control.234 Similarly, Chinese Indigenous Innovation 
policies, require an indigenous innovation product catalogue be used for its government 
procurement and implementing a Multi-Level Protection Scheme (MLPS), which requires 
product developers and manufacturers to be Chinese citizens or legal person, and product core 
technology and key components must have independent Chinese or indigenous intellectual 
property rights.235 Indian 2013 National Cyber Security Policy recognises risks accompanying 
technology from foreign suppliers,236 but instead of excluding specific products, India focuses 
on Indigenous Innovation policies and thus, placed restrictive regulations on government-
purchased technology through adopting Preferential Market Access (PMA) rules that favour 
domestic ITC suppliers and domestically manufactured electronic goods for government 
purchase instead of foreign ones.237 Interestingly enough, contrary to its mostly prevalent 
open approach, the US made a similar decision, when it banned Huawei and ZTE technology 
from its governmental systems, claiming that they pose a national security threat due to the 
Chinese government’s influence on the companies.238 
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Thus, States exercise cyberspace control within their territory in multiple different ways: both 
de facto and with reference of their understanding of de jure. Whether the approach is more 
liberal and open or defensive and restrictive depends on State’s general politics towards 
international community.  
4.2. International norms development in the field of cybersecurity 
The novelty of cyberspace has some scholars calling for new norms or reforms to the existing 
international legal framework239 in order to face the multitude of threats the said space 
enables. Continued calls for a “new, comprehensive legal framework” that is needed to 
address cyberattacks240 have led to calls for an international treaty that would be similar to the 
Outer Space Treaty (1967)241 or the UN Convention on Law of the Sea (1982),242 which 
would regulate the use of ICTs, establish the limits of sovereignty and prohibit hostile actions 
in cyberspace.243 However, in a multipolarised world, where different ideologies, doctrinal 
interpretations and strategic aspirations of major cyberpowers, such as USA, Russia and 
China, conflict, reaching a consensus agreement regarding any of the topics put forward is 
difficult an international treaty and the successful implementation thereof seems rather 
unlikely.244 
However, it is one of State’s sovereignty’s attributes to be able to bind itself with international 
obligations. A state bound by treaties and international obligations is not considered an 
encroachment on its sovereignty, but an effect of it.245 As the search for international 
cybersecurity norms, existing international law interpretations and a possible treaty are 
continuing, at some point States have to make the sovereign decision whether to bind 
themselves or not. Through exercising their sovereignty in this regard, States can influence 
where the consensus on the contested matters pertaining to cyberspace is formed. At the 
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moment, the discourse on norms for cyberspace as well as any interpretation of existing 
international law is a constant battle between the main stakeholders: China, Russia and the 
US, each of whom wish to promote their value systems in line with their political ambitions, 
strategic calculations, habits and traditions.246 
The following chapter presents two influential dialogues pertaining to the matter of 
international law and cyberspace. Firstly, UN GGE is an expert group tasked with examining 
the existing and potential threats, the application of international law and possible cooperation 
measures within cyberspace. Secondly, the discussion that is revolving around the adoption of 
a new treaty, which is lead largely by members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(hereinafter SCO) in the form of a proposed Code of Conduct.  
4.2.1. United Nations Group of Governmental Experts 
The Russian Federation was the first country to officially raise concerns of the development 
ICTs and information security in the context of international peace and security. In a 1998 
letter to UN Secretary-General Russia condemned the creation of information weapons and 
warned of the threat of information war. It also noted that developments in information 
systems might be used for purposes that ran counter to the objectives of maintaining 
international stability and security. The issues raised by Russia included the use of force, 
interference in States’ internal affairs, respect for human rights and freedoms, arms race 
pertaining to information weapons, and the threat of information wars with the purpose to 
damage the information resources and systems of another country while at the same time 
protecting its own infrastructure.247 As it was one of the first initiatives of its kind, Russia 
proposed that the topic of international information security be substantively discussed at the 
United Nations.248  
Thus, the Russian resolution initiated the international cyber security dialogue at the UN. The 
following UNGA resolution, which was adopted without a vote,249 called all nations to inform 
the Secretary-General on the questions of the issues of information security, definition of 
basic notions related to information security, included unauthorized interference with or 
misuse of information and telecommunication systems and information resources, 
development of international principles that would enhance the security of global information 
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and telecommunications systems and help to combat information terrorism and criminality.250 
The first substantial report of the UN GGE, which at the time brought together 15 States 
under the chair of Russia,251 was adopted in 2010. It highlighted the threat landscape that 
States were facing elaborating on threats, risks and vulnerabilities as well as cooperative 
measures among States.252 The 2013 UN GGE expanded substantially in the content-matter 
covered and became more explicit in the issues the group aimed to cover. The report spoke of 
existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security, cooperative measures to 
address them, including norms, rules or principles of responsible behaviour of States and 
confidence-building measures, the use of ICTs in conflicts and how international law applies 
to the use of ICTs as well as strategies aimed at strengthening the security of global 
information and telecommunications systems.253 The 2013 Report affirmed the applicability 
of international law to cyber security,254 which was at the time ground breaking. Whether or 
not cyberspace is subject to international law was a deeply political question and a wide range 
of States, including generally diverging China, Russia and the US, agreed on the notion.  
The 2015 UN GGE report, which aimed to explain how international law applies to State ICT 
related activities, reiterated that State sovereignty and international norms and principles that 
flow from the notion of sovereignty apply to State conduct in cyberspace and to their 
jurisdiction over ICT infrastructure within their territory. Furthermore, the report specified 
quite laconically that in their use of ICTs, States must observe among others the principles of 
State sovereignty, sovereign equality and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other 
States.255 The report was highly anticipated due to the ambition of the task at hand and the 
clarity it would have provided. It was hoped that deeper discussions and a larger group of 
States considering the issues would have moved the discourse of cybersecurity past its 
“infancy” stage. Yet it failed to deliver on the matter. The task – to explain the application of 
international law – was no doubt an extensive one. Even though, the report accepted the 
application of LOAC to cyberspace, the more burning question of how international law 
applies, still requires an answer.  
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A consensus report with concrete instructions of how to apply existing concepts to 
cyberspace, which is inherently a dynamic environment, would have provided guidance and 
clarity for the future State practice. Even though we have moved away from considering it a 
Wild West, there is a lot of uncertainty and perplexity concerning questions of to what extent 
and how international law exactly regulates it. That in turn leads to State practice being far 
from consistent, which affects achieving consensus on fundamental matter to a large extent. 
For example, even though the determination of sovereignty in the areas of sea, air and outer 
space ultimately required an international regime, avid State practice influenced those 
emerging international solution.256 This applies here as well. Even though the creation of a 
new regime is at the moment unlikely (see Chapter 4.2.2), yet not impossible, at first glace, 
the practice that States create influences at the minimum the interpretations States are going to 
agree or disagree upon.  
The UN GGE process allows not only diverging cyber powers, but also other States, who are 
interested in fostering a dialogue on international law and cyberspace, to come together in 
order to discuss their views and work towards a consensus solution. The format pushes States 
to take the lead and responsibility on steering the international debate on the development of 
international law pertaining to cyberspace, which one day could result for example in a 
binding interpretation of matters at hand, in a separate treaty or a normative regime that would 
govern States’ activities in cyberspace. For the main stakeholders in the process, that is China, 
Russia and the US, the group allows them to test their views, explain their value systems and 
find connections to likeminded States. 
However, the other side of the process is far less optimistic. UN GGE is still highly 
politicised, where every decision is backed by political ambition and States’ strategic 
calculations. One would only have to consider the fact that the group gathers only 15 to 20257 
States out of 193 countries in the world. It is not hard to see how it could be considered an 
elitist group, not reflecting the opinion of the international community writ large. This was 
further emphasised by Angela Kane, the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs at 
the Global Conference on Cyberspace 2015, where she noted that the 2013 UN GGE Report, 
which produced the conclusion that international law applies to cyberspace was accepted at 
the UNGA only lukewarmly. The report, which was ground breaking for the participants in 
the GGE as well as for the wider cybersecurity community, was not even supported by the 
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larger international community.258 Thus, it is a wise strategic move for the main stakeholders 
to keep the discourse going in the UN GGE, as odds are that their views would not gather a 
widespread support, if put on a vote on the UNGA. Secondly, it brings together States, such 
as the US and Russia, who look at the issues from a threat perspective. At the same time, it 
includes also States such as Ghana and Kenya, who see the problems from a development 
perspective. The possibility to find consensus, when the starting point is at the opposite 
direction is bound to be difficult. However, offering an avenue, where the discussion keeps 
going will most likely contribute to cultivating a global culture of cyber security as envisioned 
by the UN over two decades ago.259  
4.2.2. The quest for a new treaty? 
The topic of the necessity and viability of a new treaty catered solely for the regulation of 
cyberspace has been a contested issue for years. Academics have argued for the usefulness of 
a separate treaty regime, 260  whereas States have mainly argued that the international 
landscape is too premature for a comprehensive international agreement to govern 
international security.261  
Two main stakeholders – the US and Russia, have long had differed views over the need for a 
treaty. The US 2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace, put forward by the Obama 
administration stated that the “development of norms for state conduct in cyberspace does not 
require a reinvention of customary international law, nor does it render existing international 
norms obsolete. Long-standing international norms guiding state behaviour – in times of 
peace and conflict – also apply in cyberspace.”262 While it is definitely true, that does not 
necessarily mean that the rules and principles would have to be applied in their traditional 
interpretation. The novel character of cyberspace, the vulnerability of information 
infrastructure and other “unique attributes of networked technology” might require 
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clarification and reconsideration of lex lata.263 The US approach goes to show that the US 
does not want to use their sovereign rights to bind themselves with an international treaty 
before it is absolutely necessary or beneficial for them. That is also consistent with its general 
practice vis-à-vis international treaties and other binding instruments. In a comparison 
analysis of major international law instruments, the US had accepted a total of 16 instruments, 
compared to Russia having accepted 18 and China respectively 24 fundamental international 
law treaties and instruments.264 Moreover, there are few examples in the history, where the 
US has exercised its sovereign right to withdraw the consent of being bound to an 
international instrument. For example, the US withdrew the optional clause declaration265 
binding US with the ICJ jurisdiction, during the ICJ Nicaragua case, arguing that ICJ did not 
have jurisdiction.266 Similarly, the US signed the Rome Statute267 establishing the ICC, 
having been part of the negotiations. However, the signature was later suspended and the UN 
Secretary General was informed that the US recognised no obligation toward the Rome 
Statute and had no intention to become a party thereof.268 Even though unusual, it still 
represented a valid exercise of State sovereignty and it is clear that the US has as of yet no 
intention to increase its obligations under international law pertaining to cyberspace in the 
form of a new treaty. 
Whereas USA is of the position that existing international law norms are sufficient in order to 
address State activities in cyberspace,269 Russia, China and a few other SCO Member States 
put forward in 2011 a proposal for a voluntary International Code of Conduct for Information 
Security regulating State behaviour in cyberspace. Indicating thus that the Sino-Russo 
thinking sees the need for additional special regulation of cyberspace. In 2015 the same circle 
of countries (with added supporters Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) presented the UN Secretary-
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General with the revised version of the Code of Conduct.270 The Codes of Conduct represent a 
strict enforcement of cyber sovereignty, which emphasised the government’s legal right to 
enforce its own laws within its own borders and control the flow of data. In the UN GGE 
process, both Codes of Conduct have been noted, yet not substantially discussed or 
considered.271 The possible reason could lie in the absolutist interpretation of the State and 
territorial sovereignty enshrined in the proposed Codes of Conduct. They also miss essential 
questions such as the use of proxies and the regulation of activities of non-State actors, and do 
not reflect the adequate level of protection of human rights, which does not sit well with the 
West. However, since a consensus on the basis of Codes of Conducts does not seem to be 
achieved any time soon, Russia and China have started to forge a bilateral relationship 
pertaining to cybersecurity, leaving the US as one of the major cyberpowers to the 
sidelines.272  
Governments as well as other actors alike are employing ICTs and other high technologies in 
pursuit of their strategic interest. Since 1998, leading powers – most notably the US, Russia 
and China – have discussed the issue of applicability of international law to the development 
and use of ICTs and “cyber security” in different venues.273 National positions and expert 
contributions to the theme have failed to provide an inclusive, holistic, theoretically grounded 
and critical discourse on the subject.  
In general, the international dialogue on the matter at hand is dominated by few cyber and 
normative powers with strong national interests in the issue. Leading powers differ in their 
underlying assumptions as to whether proliferation and dissemination of ICTs is to be 
regarded as an opportunity or a threat. The majority of countries lack strategic understanding 
and the role as well as implications of ICTs are still emerging in most countries. Due to 
technology-heavy emphasis, the discourse of international norms development pertaining to 
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activities in cyberspace has been largely disconnected from developments in international law 
and normative thought more broadly. On the one hand, the UN GGE has not been able to 
offer States viable interpretations of international law applicable to State conduct in 
cyberspace. On the other hand, we are a long way away from an international treaty 
governing cyberspace, similar to the Outer Space Treaty. Yet, in the meanwhile, the issue of 
international law as applied to advanced technologies is gaining further urgency and acuteness 
due to the interrelation between ICTs and other advanced technologies, in particular 
unmanned and autonomous systems. If conscious effort is not made by States to develop a 
realistic solution for cyberspace, the advancement of technologies combined with States’ 
strategic and political interests will reduce international law to virtuous yet marginal system 
of rules in the organised hypocrisy. 
4.3. From the breach of sovereignty to intervention: an organized hypocrisy 
“When major tides of change wash over the world, power structures almost inevitably 
reject the notion that the world really is changing and they cling to their old beliefs. In 
the past some changes came slowly and gave us the time we needed to adjust to a new 
reality. In the last years of this century, however, the velocity of change in the world has 
become so great that there are literally no precedents to guide us. Policymakers are 
discovering that many of the events that are altering the world come not in response to 
their actions but are driven by technologies which they may only dimly understand.”274 
International law has created norms for States to respect each other’s sovereignty. Yet, in 
cyber domain, where physical borders are elusive, most activities take place inherently cross-
border choosing the fastest way to arrive to its destination, regardless of the ownership of 
underlying networks, several jurisdictions or sovereign authority over them. The 
interconnectedness is used and abused by States for several purposes, e.g. cyber attacks with 
the aim of achieving a specific goal, subversion or espionage. When deploying an offensive 
cyber operation, a State makes the sovereign choice of non-compliance with the existing and 
well-established law, accepting the consequences of their behaviour. Depending on whether 
the operation possesses also a coercive element to be used on the victim State’s, such 
operations can be categorised from breaches of sovereignty to violations of the non-
intervention principle.275 Intervention is seen as coercive interference, leaving out non-
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coercive forms of interference as simple violations of sovereignty outside of the scope of 
intervention. Intervention in essence aims to impose certain conduct of consequence on a 
sovereign State.276 For the purposes of this thesis, the term intervention will include coercive 
acts that influence the internal or external matters that each State is permitted to decide 
freely.277 It follows that not all violations of territory or sovereignty immediately concern the 
principle of non-intervention. Intervention lies between the prohibition on the use of force 
deriving from Article 2(4) UN Charter and the prohibition of simple violations of sovereignty, 
being thus “not insignificant, but also not supreme among wrongful acts.”278 
 
Figure 2. Spectrum of State activities from violation of sovereignty to armed attack 
Observation that there is “a rather serious gap between what a broad view of the 
nonintervention norm would require and what states actually do”279 is not a novelty. Stephen 
Krasner called such practice already in 1999 an “organised hypocrisy”. The past decade of 
State practice in low-intensity offensive cyber operations conducted by States has not 
managed to constructively contribute to the development nor clearer interpretation of existing 
rules. There have been claims that operations that do not cross the threshold of UN Charter 
Article 2(4) are either legal280 or the current international law regulation is not sufficient in 
order to provide an effective legal framework for low-intensity cyber operations281 that breach 
State’s sovereignty. Thus, they are often brushed aside, reasons being for example the 
difficulty of technical attribution of the attack or the lack of political prowess to challenge the 
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attacking State on the basis of international law and the rights and obligations deriving from 
it. As State practice of cyber operations with an offensive, yet low-intensity character has 
shown in the past, the victim States are not likely to contest the breach under international 
law, the only exception being USA after the Sony hack in 2014. However, failing to perceive 
low-intensity cyber operations as a threat and neglecting addressing them in the international 
discourse hampers States’ long-term security, gives the advantage to the attackers,282creates 
non-constructive State practice that ignores international law and creates a perfect storm, 
where rules exist, but are not followed. Thus, the gap appears to be even wider today, where 
oftentimes the references to the non-intervention principle “are no more than pro forma 
incantations, with political, not legal, import.”283 
Recourse to the principle of non-intervention is most likely taken, when the State is the 
victim, not when it is conducting its own offensive activities. States respect international law, 
if it brings them valuable objectives, such as security, rule of law or good governance.284 
However, the lack of discussion on the topic of non-intervention in the cyber domain has 
proven the low priority of the principle among States, a decision that has wider political and 
strategic implications. Instead, the focus is on the opportunities provided by the cyberspace: it 
has offered States a new domain, where to expand their power, and pursue national interests. 
States do not need to recourse to the use of force anymore to achieve majority of their goals. 
Due to the interconnected and global nature of cyberspace, States are able to achieve wanted 
effects remotely, without placing their assets at physical risk at the location.285, 286 In a largely 
interdependent word, cyber operations, especially the low-intensity ones allow States to be 
more intrusive with less destructive means, which has been proven in the last decade 
numerous times. Subsequently, States of all sizes find it easier than ever to accomplish their 
national security objectives and exercise sovereignty through breaching other State’s 
sovereignty. From disrupting an adversary’s propaganda efforts to sending active and visible 
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messages of their own, from aggressive intelligence collection to subversion, supporting 
military operations and conducting sabotage,287 limits of sovereign conduct in cyberspace are 
often determined by States’ capabilities rather than traditional State boundaries and 
international law. 
The first case that caught the attention of the international community at large and brought the 
subject matter of cyber operations and state sovereignty into the consciousness of 
Governments was the cyber attack on Estonia in 2007. However, States are suspected of 
taking actions against other nation-States already decades before that. In the so-called 
“Cuckoo’s Egg” espionage case in 1986 Soviet Union’s Committee for State’s Security 
(hereinafter KGB) paid German hackers to steal information from the US.288 The series of 
intrusions, dubbed “Moonlight Maze” took place a decade later, in the late 1990s, when US 
Government sites were intruded once again.289 Yet, it was 2007 when supposedly Russian 
originated attacks on Estonian governmental and private servers started shedding light on 
State actions in cyberspace. Followed by attacks in Georgia in 2008 where again Russia was 
the supposed perpetrator,290 the Stuxnet attack in 2010, with USA and Israel suspected in 
deploying the attack291 and Saudi Aramco attack in 2012, where connection was sought to 
Iran looking for a retaliatory response to the Stuxnet attack two years earlier,292 it was clear 
that the State offensive cyber operations were on the rise. Shortly after Saudi Aramco attack, 
several banks in the US were hit with large-scale DDoS attacks. Even though an Islamist 
cyber-fighters group claimed responsibility for the actions, international attention focused 
quickly on Iran, presumably seeking revenge for US-led economic sanctions and the Stuxnet 
attack on Iran’s nuclear power plant in Natanz in 2010.293 Lastly, the recent alleged hack of 
Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2014 brought about the first official “attribution,” when the 
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US Federal Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter FBI) claimed to have evidence that North 
Korea was responsible for the attack.294 
 
Figure 3. Timeline of most prominent State-on-State operations 
The present work makes the claim that none of the above-mentioned cases crossed the 
threshold of UN Charter Article 2(4), yet several of the attacks, such as extensive DoS and 
DDoS attacks aimed at important governmental, economic or financial networks in order to 
influence State’s policy decisions or actions can amount to an unlawful intervention.295 
Secondly, operations aimed at critical infrastructure or activities that yield significant 
economic consequences could be considered to have possessed the coercive element needed 
to categorise them as unlawful interventions,296 given that successful attribution would be 
achieved. If no coercive element can be found, the attacks would still amount to violations of 
State sovereignty. Thus, international law provides long-standing rules that ought to protect 
State sovereignty from violations. Yet, these are also the norms that are most frequently 
breached. 
If the attack does not amount to intervention, the logical question is what constitutes a breach 
of a State’s sovereignty in cyberspace, yet it has no unified answer. The UN GGE 2015 
Report did not elaborate on what constitutes a breach of sovereignty. It has been opined that 
territorial sovereignty, including in cyberspace, is violated by any acts causing physical 
effects.297 It definitely violates State’s sovereignty, if damage is caused.298 However, such 
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restrictive interpretation would only magnify non-compliance. Majority of low-intensity cyber 
operations that can affect severely the everyday functioning of a heavily technology 
dependent State, yet yield no physical damage. They are also inexpensive, easy to employ and 
can be used during peacetime to target for example political leadership, military systems, 
banking or communication sector wherever in the world with the benefit of attacker 
anonymity.299  
Hence, the question is, whether State’s offensive cyber operations that yield no physical 
effects would be considered a breach of sovereignty? That would be the situation, for 
example, when a malware has been entered in a State’s information system or critical 
infrastructure by another State. It may have other functionalities, but in essence it does not 
affect the system in any adverse way. Here, it is useful to think about what are we protecting 
when talking about a breach of sovereignty. When a breach occurs, another State or its actors 
enter the sovereignty space of another State without permission. The right in question is the 
sovereign right to decide what is happening on your territory. When exercises of sovereignty 
can be limited due to external obligations that States have taken upon them, then sovereignty 
in abstracto, i.e. as a concept is a whole and should be protected as a whole. One cannot 
breach sovereignty “a little bit”. Either sovereignty is breached or not. If a State actor enters 
the territory of another State without prior consent or permission, that actor is violating the 
sovereignty of that State, unless there is a justification recognised by law to allow such 
conduct in extraordinary circumstances. To exemplify the logic, a useful parallel here could 
be found in the airspace. Every State has a complete and exclusive sovereignty over the 
airspace above its territory.300 Whereas States must provide civil aircrafts the right to fly over 
its territory, it does not have provide that for other State’s military vehicles.301 Thus, if such a 
vehicle enters State’s airspace, it has breached its sovereignty. If the vehicle was in the 
airspace for a few minutes and it had no other effects on the State whose airspace was 
violated, was it still a breach of sovereignty? The present work would argue that it was. 
Breach of sovereignty requires an act. Those acts can either take place or not and depending 
on States’ modes of action, the act is detected and attributed if possible. The question that 
follows from there is if the State is going to react to the breach or not. Yet, whether political 
or legal action is taken as a response depends already on the political decision-making. 
Taking into account the inherent interconnectedness that is created by the global information 
infrastructure, it is not optimal to think that a State would raise each breach as a violation on 
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the international plane. However, the State retains the right to do so, should it wish, since it 
derives from their sovereignty.  
Thus, it can be argued that physical damage or even physical effects are irrelevant in the 
cyber context. For example, the US has indicated that it considers its territorial sovereignty 
violated also by “disruption of networks and systems”.302 This approach includes intrusions, 
which may or may not show a physical effect. Similarly, Russia has concluded that cyber 
espionage, which does not yield any physical consequences, is a direct violation of their 
sovereignty.303 Different playing rules reinforce the State practice, which essentially ignores 
the standards that international law has set. Clarity as to the matter, what can and cannot be 
considered a breach of sovereignty or intervention in the context of cyberspace, helps States 
to understand the ground rules in State-on-State conduct. Slowly but steadily moving issues 
pertaining to cyberspace and security thereof to the scope of issues regulated by international 
law through interpretation of existing norms according to the needs of new technologies 
might lead to a reduced expectation of protection from foreign States’ intervention or overall 
meddling in these areas,304 because an organised hypocrisy ought to not become the norm of 
State behaviour in cyberspace. 
As the State’s interventionist techniques have changed, the broader question will be: should 
the international community try to apply the established framework and existing standards or 
just conclude that the existing standards indeed do not afford for effective legal solutions, and 
thus leave the regulation of described cyber operations in a legal vacuum. As Judge Alvarez 
noted in the Corfu Channel case, the rights and obligations are not the same and not exercised 
in the same way in every sphere of international law. Thus, the violation of sovereign rights is 
not of equal gravity in all these spheres.305 ICTs have provided States with a new domain, in 
which to expand their power and compete with one another. As threats emanating from 
cyberspace and malicious uses of ICTs continue to morph and disrupt established legal 
frameworks, ways in which States assert their sovereignty and power will continually develop 
and adapt to changing circumstances.306 International law, in turn, is slow to adapt to new 
realities and the changing security landscape. The State practice elaborated above exemplifies 
that States are willing to non-comply with existing international law, if it benefits them. Yet, 
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turning a blind eye to minor breaches of sovereignty impairs legal certainty. Whatever the 
new circumstances, sovereignty will always mean freedom within the law, not freedom from 
the law.307  
Rethinking existing standards, or interpretations that do not consider changed circumstances 
and rapidly evolving technologies is to a certain extent necessary, otherwise, the current 
structure of cyberspace makes it “very attractive to ignore international law”.308 The aim of 
the non-intervention principle and respect for sovereignty is not only to allow States to 
operate free from outside interference but also to reinforce the notion of sovereign equality 
among States.309 The reality is, that when an objective can be achieved either with forceful 
coercive measure or with the help of a rather cost-effective cyber operation, the natural choice 
today will be the latter.310 Thus, one must look beyond LOAC and use of force and start 
seeing what is the coercive “force” of 21st century. More than ever, it becomes clear that 
modern assertions of power replace violence and force of arms with ‘more gentle constraint of 
uninterrupted visibility’.311 As Nancy Fraser observed already in the 1980s, 
“Modern power, then, is distinctive in that it keeps a low profile. It has no need of the 
spectacular displays characteristic of the exercise of power in the ancien regime. It is 
lower in cost (economically, since it requires less labor power; and also socially, since it 
is less easily targeted for resistance). Yet it is more efficacious.”312 
This is even more the case in today’s security landscape. The international framework of 
sovereignty has not become desolate. It belongs to the core of international law. Yet, when 
visible violence and physical coercion is replaced with the “more gentle constraint of 
uninterrupted visibility,”313 the legal checks and balances of low-profile power determine its 
efficacy. The more straightforward and clear the legal standards and principles are, the less 
likely it is that cyber operations are justified by the high standards adopted in a completely 
different security landscape and vagueness of existing regulation that lets States escape 
responsibility for their exercises of sovereignty. States have not realised their full capabilities. 
Furthermore, those, who have the appropriate capabilities will not want to constrain them, 
rather the opposite. Focusing solely on visible, i.e. traditional military, political and economic 
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violations automatically exclude the most advanced and intrusive ones that can create even 
more serious effects. The State power exercised through the low-intensity cyber operations is 
more penetrating and less observable than earlier forms of power. As Sean Watts observes, 
comparisons to the “death by a thousand cuts” are apt.314 They offer anonymity, low-
visibility, can be timed to look like unrelated or isolated events, are unlikely to provoke 
debilitating responses from targets, yet are able to target the deepest part of State’s 
infrastructure if needed, and the best part: if one were to follow the currently prevalent 
approach and discard all breaches that do not yield physical consequences, such uses of power 
and exercise of sovereignty may might fall outside of the scope of legal regulation. As Frasier 
noted, modern assertions of power get “hold of its objects at the deepest level – in their 
gestures, habits, bodies and desires.”315 The targets rarely see the attacks coming, are mostly 
unaware, if someone is exploiting their infrastructure, and in an interdependent and 
interconnected world with relatively large amount of ICT reliant States, it is easy to hit where 
it hurts the most effectively.   
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5. International law and cyberspace juxtaposed 
International law and politics cannot be considered to exist detached from each other. 
Delimiting international law from the politics and political of it would make more for a 
scholarly exercise than a relevant problem solving undertaking. As Martti Koskenniemi has 
put forward, they present a Wittgensteinian duck-rabbit, where what point of view one has, 
depends on the angle the object is being observed from.316 International law is politics as 
much as politics is international law. Taking the politics out of international law, disconnects 
the latter from the reality. It becomes a utopia, which may be virtuous its goals, but marginal 
in the world’s functioning. Yet, over-emphasising the political and State practice in turn 
undermines the normativity of international law.317 Finding balance between the two has been 
engaging international lawyers for years.318  
The balancing act must be taken into account in the cybersecurity discourse as well. Rules and 
concepts alone tell very little about their application in real life. Habits and traditions play a 
crucial role in the interpretation of those rules and concepts.319 Thus, the pressure to the 
concept of sovereignty as well as to international law in general comes from two sources. 
Firstly, the technology itself and the accompanying development challenge international rules, 
concepts, and practices that have been created largely in the middle of last century. Inquiries 
into what technology changes and how the new technological reality affects the relationships 
between States are crucial ones. The development of technology and increased cooperation in 
inter-State relations has already changed the security landscape: almost half of the mankind 
has become connected,320 very few issues can be considered isolated so that one could claim 
that they do not affect other States and for the most part, States are not able to tackle today’s 
security threats alone. That is already true in the cyber domain, where State activities take 
place not only on their territory, but also in an intangible domain, threats are often cross-
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border, affect multiple States and one State’s decision to close access to its infrastructure has 
the possibility to disconnect and isolate a whole State.  
Depending on technologies, certain States are always the ones to have an upper hand when it 
comes to technological development. States will never be equal in technological prowess. 
Thus, the question is, for whom the new technologies (e.g. 5G networks, autonomous 
weapons systems, artificial intelligence, Internet of things) will provide most benefits in the 
future. Thus far, the US has been a clear dominant in the field and that shines through in the 
international law discussions as well,321 leading at times the State to follow the ethos of the 
Schmittian decisionism. An approach according to which the State can be the final decision-
maker on the exception,322 regardless of what international law says, enforces the idea that 
“[n]orms are nice, but in cases of necessity, we are better off with decisions”.323 For example, 
after the 2014 Sony hack in the US, president Obama stated that “We will respond 
proportionally [to North Korea’s hack of Sony], and we’ll respond in a place and time and 
manner that we choose.”324 The latter approach clearly emphasises that those who have the 
technology, have the upper hand and thus, can be considered the decision-makers and they are 
very much aware, that States do not enjoy the sovereign equality that international law 
formally bestows upon them.325 Numerous advances in technology will not enable all States 
to level the playing field and thus, the technology itself influences who can decide over the 
future and development international law in the field. 
Secondly, international law also shaped and affected by the thinking of the leading States. 
Two different schools on the adequacy of the existing international law lead the international 
cybersecurity discourse. On the one hand, there are those, who claim that the existing law is 
adequate to resolve the issues brought about by the cyberspace. The main advocates for the 
view are the US and likeminded countries, including Estonia. The present thesis argues as 
well that we do not need new laws per se but we must take into account the changed security 
landscape. The solution that aims at providing clarity and predictability must rest on 
established norms, yet be mindful of the new technological reality, i.e. it is not just the 
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novelty but also the pervasive utility of ICTs that must guide the choices we make concerning 
international law. The core and idea of law or established concepts, be it sovereignty, use of 
force or self-defence, does not change just because technology changes the world. Applying 
and interpreting the law in new circumstances is challenging, yet as explained, this is not the 
first time, when technology has changed and will not be the last time. The starting point must 
be the law, not what judges and academics say about the law, i.e. how they interpret it 
according to the needed perspective. As such, the law does not change according to 
circumstances, but the interpretation does. Thus, one of the solutions in the cybersecurity 
discourse would be to reinterpret the law we already have. In order to do that, taking into 
account the political reality and existing State practice is paramount. However, the second 
point about interpreting existing law refers back to what was claimed in the beginning of this 
thesis. The cybersecurity discourse has leaped over fundamental concepts of international law 
when discussing how international law applies. We have been preparing for a cyber-Pearl 
Harbour,326 yet the question of sovereignty, upon which the concepts of use of force, armed 
attack and self-defence rest, is very much still open for States to interpret as they choose. 
While NATO has confirmed that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty327 applies to cyber 
operations as well,328 the discussion on when and where a State’s sovereignty is being 
breached is unclear. The strategic goal of States here might be to allow themselves the 
freedom of non-compliance when it comes to low-intensity operations that can be later 
justified by the unclearness or vagueness of the law. Yet, it is especially here, that the 
organised hypocrisy must not become a norm. We do not need to re-conceptualise 
sovereignty, but we must take into account that although cyberspace can be construed as more 
territorial as expected through its infrastructure, State’s sovereignty and exercises thereof 
have also de- and extra-territorialised. States are using their power broader than just along 
their territorial lines.329 Therefore, interpretation can be one of the ways of how to move the 
discourse further without changing or negotiating new treaties. Even though agreeing on a 
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singular interpretation might prove to be difficult, re-interpretation based on existing concepts 
allows States to remain flexible and not increase the amount of treaty obligations. 
On the other hand, there are those, who say that international law applies, yet cyberspace is a 
special domain, where existing rules do not offer enough protection for the malicious uses of 
ICTs by States. Therefore, new laws or a special treaty regime is needed. The proponents of 
this particular view are mainly SCO member states, led by China and Russia. Even though a 
new, technology-driven and enabled reality offers at the moment little prospect for a treaty-
based solution, it cannot be counted out as a feasible solution when consensus on the 
application of international law to cyberspace will not be achieved. As explained, some have 
though the treaty approach to be premature or unnecessary. A treaty approach to relatively 
unsettled issues is not only time-consuming, but also predicted by remaining differences 
about concepts, definitions and the scope of applicability of already existing norms. 
Additionally, States are likely to want to preserve their freedom of action, not to mention that 
the verification of treaty compliance is bound to be difficult. However, if consensus is not 
found based on the existing law, a new treaty could be a solution for achieving some legal 
clarity over States’ activities in cyberspace. This would then create separate regime dedicated 
to cybersecurity and allow States to argue only in terms of the said special “box” of 
regulation.330 Yet, here one must proceed with caution. The fragmentation of international law 
was thoroughly researched by the International Law Commission and culminated with their 
report published in 2006. The report concluded that multiple specialist systems, such as 
human rights law, space law, humanitarian law etc., have been created in order to govern 
fields what once appeared to be governed by general international law. This, in turn, has 
created the danger of conflicting and incompatible rules, principles, rule-systems and 
institutional practices. Even though it is understandable that such specialised law emerges as a 
response to new technical and functional realities, very often the new rules and regimes 
develop in order to consciously deviate from what was provided by the general law. As such, 
the unity and coherence of international law suffers.331 Fragmentation to some extent is 
natural, i.e. the diversity of national legal systems that participate in international legal system 
has created inherent fragmentation.332 However, the more self-contained regimes are created 
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by the international community, the more marginal the existing body of international law 
becomes, as the “exception” will be come the “rule”. When it comes to cybersecurity, the 
pervasive utility of ICTs has penetrated almost all fields of society. Whether it would be 
efficient to create another self-contained regime of “cyberlaw” to regulate State behaviour is 
questionable, taking into account the wider development of technology. States have spent 
over a decade discussing whether international law applies to cyberspace or not before 
concluding in 2013 that it does.333 The pace at which international community agrees or 
disagrees on matters at hand does not correlate adequately with the pace of the technological 
development, allowing thus, once again, States to ignore international law, if it benefits them. 
It is clear that anyone who wishes to propose a real and viable solution to the conundrums at 
hand must take both viewpoints into account, which are often hard to reconcile. A solution for 
cyberspace that is being led by either of the schools alone, is not feasible and invites for non-
compliance from the other one. Thus, the discourse on how international law applies to 
cyberspace, which is still in its “infancy”,334 must take into account the underlying law as well 
as politics and State practice in the field. It cannot be solved in a vacuum, since politics and 
the aspirations of States influence profoundly, in what form and how the application of 
international law to cyberspace is decided and where consensuses formed. 
The title of this thesis asks, if sovereignty in cyberspace is an organised hypocrisy. If one 
accepts Krasner’s view that it has always characterised the sovereign State system, the answer 
to a great extent is affirmative.335 Sovereignty, respect for other States’ sovereignty and 
prohibition of intervention are some of the longest standing norms that are frequently violated 
by States using low-intensity cyber operations. The pervasiveness, anonymity and ease of use 
have made it enticing for States to achieve set goals through cyber means. Legal uncertainty 
and ambiguity accompanying the discussion on how existing international law applies to State 
conduct and exercises of sovereignty in cyberspace offer States the “perfect storm” for 
violating the existing rules for their own benefit or interpret existing law as they see fit. As 
there is probably no single set of rules that could align interest, power and legal rules and 
principles,336 States, at least the most powerful, ambitious or impatient of them, will always 
have the incentive to deviate from existing norms, if it supports their strategic ambition or 
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turns out to be otherwise advantageous. The calculative logic of immediate benefits and 
desirable consequences can oftentimes override the logic of virtue and appropriateness. 
States, seeking to maintain their own position and promote their interests, can make the 
sovereign decision to comply or not to comply.337 The combination of global connectivity, 
vulnerable technologies and anonymity has facilitated the use of ICTs for disruptive activities 
in the hands of States. If they have the resources, cyberspace has enabled States to deviate 
from existing international law and breach other States’ sovereignty more easily and 
oftentimes with no consequences. If one affirms the inherent existence of organised hypocrisy 
when it comes to State sovereignty, the goal for any normative solution to the regulation of 
cyberspace ought to aim for stopping it becoming the norm of accepted State behaviour.  
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Conclusion 
The main research questions of the thesis were: How does sovereignty apply and how do 
States assert and exercise their sovereign rights in cyberspace? As suggested in the 
introduction, the present thesis is not intended as an all-embracing account on sovereignty or 
sovereignty in cyberspace for that matter. The aim was to offer a critical and complementary 
perspective on the debate on sovereignty in cyberspace. Therefore, it built on the existing 
understanding and scholarship of these issues.  
The first chapter examined briefly the expert vocabulary used in the cybersecurity discourse. 
The chapter also explained that different States use different lexicons. While the Western 
world, leading with the US utters terms with the prefix “cyber-“, then Russia, China and 
countries that value and speak of the importance of State sovereignty focus on information, 
information security, and information operations, a move which is in line with their claims of 
control over national information space. 
The second chapter took a closer look to the general concept of sovereignty. The chapter 
outlined the basic tenets of territorial sovereignty and explained the difference between the 
concept of sovereignty and respective exercises of sovereignty in concreto. Besides exercising 
territorial sovereignty, one of the attributes of sovereignty is the right to bind the State with 
international obligations. As such, exercising sovereignty is compiled of a bundle of rights 
and obligations, which can change in time, making the concept of sovereignty relative. The 
chapter also explored some of the claims of the decline, withering away or death of 
sovereignty, yet concluded that the binary inquiry into State sovereignty is not sustainable. As 
sovereignty has not been ultimately defined, sovereignty has the ability to change through 
time. It also varies from State to State, as the amount of obligations that States bind 
themselves with vary. 
The third chapter continued with the exploration of sovereignty in connection with 
cyberspace. More specifically, the chapter asked how the concept of territorial sovereignty is 
being applied vis-à-vis ICTs. Cyberspace and sovereignty are often seen as an oxymoron, 
since cyberspace is largely intangible. Thus, the cyberlibertarians proposed that this new 
domain should be independent and self-governing. As a result, no State could exercise their 
sovereignty over the cyberspace. However, their arguments are undermined with different 
fallacies, as explained in the thesis. Besides the no-sovereignty approach, there are generally 
two misconceptions surrounding the discourse of sovereignty in cyberspace. Firstly, 
cyberspace is often mistakenly found to be part of the global commons together with airspace, 
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international waters and outer space. However, taking into account its artificial nature, lack of 
physical boundaries and rest of the characteristics that global commons as a phenomenon 
have according to the test offered by Patrick W. Franzese, it was concluded that cyberspace is 
currently not understood as part of the global commons. That, in turn, does not mean that the 
discourse ought to exclude this as an option. However, in the light of the Franzese test, 
establishing such a regime would be difficult. Secondly, partly deriving from the global 
commons argument, cyberspace is often seen as a domain, where sovereignty does not apply. 
However, States will remain sovereigns and can assert authority therein, regardless of its 
party intangible nature. Most importantly, States have the authority over the information 
infrastructure located in their territory, which means that it is subject to legal and regulatory 
control by the State, yet is also protected by the inviolability of territorial sovereignty.  
The fourth chapter focused on the different forms of exercises of sovereignty that States are 
engaging in when it comes to cyberspace. States are exercising internal sovereignty vis-à-vis 
the infrastructure located in their territory and the access and egress of their territory. Some 
States, such as the US, have adopted a more liberal approach, focusing on the openness of the 
system, while other exercise their sovereignty rather defensively and restrictively. To 
exemplify the latter position examples were brought from Russia and China, both of whom 
are strictly proponents of the ultimate value of State sovereignty. Besides exercising territorial 
sovereignty, one of the attributes of sovereignty is the right to bind the State by international 
obligations. One of the avenues, where States exercise control is the international norms 
development process for cyberspace, where either in the process of UN GGE or through SCO 
and the proposals of Code of Conducts, States seek to promote their value systems pertaining 
to cyberspace. The chapter also briefly discussed the calls of academics for a new treaty, 
similar to the Outer Space Treaty, which would govern the use, abuse and other exploitation 
of cyberspace. Yet, one had to conclude that States, who possess the ability to conclude 
treaties, are not ready for such a comprehensive solution. Lastly, the chapter explained that 
besides positive exercises of sovereignty, States oftentimes make use of the ambiguous nature 
of cyberspace and consciously breach other State’s sovereignty, knowing the law and possible 
consequences, but still deciding to ignore it. Stephen Krasner calls this situation the organized 
hypocrisy. 
The last chapter juxtaposing cyberspace and international law concluded that international 
law is influenced by two distinct developments: technology and the thinking of leading States. 
Technology gives the upper hand on deciding on the regulation and development of 
international law to those who have said technology. Thinking of the leading States and their 
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practice is influencing the solutions that States offer for the problems at hand. Here, two 
schools can be distinguished. One, led by the US, that emphasises the applicability of existing 
international law and the other, that insists on the creation of new law or establishing a treaty 
regime. Both solutions come with their caveats. It is clear that any solution that aims at 
regulating cyberspace must take into account the established law, norms and principles as 
well as the politics and aspirations of States. Since no normative solution can satisfy the 
interests of all, the organised hypocrisy can be considered inherent in the international system, 
i.e. there will always be States who will not abide by the rules. Thus, it is not for the 
international law to eradicate the organised hypocrisy, but to make sure it will not become an 
accepted State behaviour. 
The thesis took a forward-looking approach, trying offer a fresh perspective on the current 
discourse. It is clear that cyber-related discourse will not be the last time technology 
challenges international law. With every new development in technology, States are going to 
become more intrusive, more penetrating, yet at the same time more undetectable, anonymous 
and untraceable whilst achieving their goals and strategic ambitions. States do not assert 
power only by open diplomacy, trade and arms and violence, but increasingly as invisibly as 
possible. In this context, the question of sovereignty is as apt as ever before, as international 
law and rules that flow from the concept of sovereignty ought to offer real solutions to real 
situations. Thus, the international community cannot allow ignoring the fundamental 
questions of international law discourse. Rather, it needs deep substantial discussion and 
feasible interpretations as solutions for the technology future to come. 
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Suveräänsus küberruumis: organiseeritud silmakirjalikkus? 
Resümee 
Tehnoloogia kiire areng ja informatsiooniaja võidukäik on muutnud paljud riigid info- ja 
kommunikatsioonitehnoloogiatest (järgnevalt IKT) sõltuvaks. Viimane mõjutab aga olulisel 
määral nii rahvuslikku julgeolekut kui ka riigi suveräänsuse teostamist. Antud töö eesmärk ei 
olnud esitada suveräänsuse ajaloolist ülevaadet ega pakkuda ühte ja lõplikku interpretatsiooni 
suveräänsusest küberruumis, vaid käesoleva töö põhiküsimused olid: kuidas suveräänsus kui 
kontseptsioon kohaldub ja kuidas riigid teostavad suveräänsust küberruumis? 
Küberturvalisuse diskursus rahvusvahelise õiguse raames on loomult nii poliitiline kui 
õiguslik. Seda näitab ka see, et riigid kasutavad antud diskursuse raames erinevat sõnavara 
probleemide kirjeldamiseks ning arutamiseks, asetades seeläbi rõhu problemaatika erinevatele 
aspektidele. Kui läänemaailm USA juhtimisel asetab fookuse eesliitele “küber-“, siis 
Venemaa, Hiina ja teised riigid, kes väärtustavad enim riigi suveräänsust, rõhutavad eelkõige 
informatsiooni ning selle turvalisust. Erinevus tekib seeläbi, et pannes kokku fraasid 
“küberturvalisus” ja “küberruum”, toonitab läänemaailm ühtse mõistena nii informatsiooni 
infrastruktuuri kui ka informatsiooni enda turvalisust, samas kui “informatsiooni turvalisus” 
ja “informatsiooniruum” hoiavad antud kaks aspekti lahus. Viimane lähenemine aga 
võimaldab riikidel nagu Venemaa ja Hiina kontrollida lisaks infrastruktuurile ka 
informatsiooni liikumist ning seda piirata, kui see peaks riigile vajalik olema. 
Pöördudes suveräänsuse kui kontseptsiooni teoreetilise külje poole, analüüsis käesolev töö 
territoriaalse suveräänsuse põhilisi omadusi ning selgitas erinevust suveräänsuse kui 
kontseptsiooni ja suveräänsuse teostamise vahel. Suveräänsus on üldised defineeritud läbi 
riigi territooriumi. Siseriiklikult on suverään see, kes teostab jurisdiktsiooni ilma teiste riikide 
sekkumiseta. Suhetes teiste riikidega tähendab suveräänsust võrdsust teiste riikidega 
rahvusvahelisel tasandil, millest tulenevalt lasub riikidel kohustus austada üksteise 
suveräänsust. Antud kontseptsioon peegeldub ka mittesekkumise põhimõttes. Suveräänsuse 
teostamine võib aga toimuda mitmes vormis. Nimelt üks kõige levinumaid suveräänsuse 
teostamise vorme rahvusvahelisel tasandil on rahvusvaheliste kohustustega liitumine, st 
rahvusvahelised lepingud või muud instrumendid. Viimast ei peeta aga suveräänsuse 
äraandmiseks, piiramiseks või jagamiseks, sest riigid saavad ennast siduda rahvusvaheliste 
kohustustega just seetõttu, et nad on suveräänid. Seega tuleb vastavalt rahvusvahelise õiguse 
praktikale eristada suveräänsust kui kontseptsiooni ning suveräänsuse teostamist. Kui esimest 
saab rikkuda, kuid ei saa per se ära anda, siis suveräänsuse teostamist saab riik ise piirata 
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vastavalt sellele, mis kohustusi ta on endale võtnud. Suveräänsuse teostamine on seotud 
mitmete õiguste ja kohustustega, mille maht aja jooksul võib muutuda. Seega on õigustatud 
ka vaade, mille alusel suveräänsuse teostamise ulatus sõltub ajast ning riigi suhete arengust 
rahvusvahelisel tasandil. Samuti ei ole õigustatud väited suveräänsuse “surmast” ning 
ärakadumisest. Seni kaua kuni eksisteerib rahvusvahelisel tasandil iseseisvate riikide süsteem, 
seni kaua on oluline positsioon ka suveräänsusel. Siiski järeldas käesolev töö, et binaarsed 
diskussioonid sellest, kas suveräänsus on või ei ole “surnud” ei ole edasiviivad. Kuna 
suveräänsuse mõistele pole ühtset definitsiooni pakutud, on see ajas ning ruumis muutunud. 
Samuti on suveräänsuse sisustamine riigiti erinev, sest kohustuste maht, millega riigid ennast 
seovad on erinevate riikide puhul erinev. 
Rääkides suveräänsusest küberruumi kontekstis tundub esmapilgul olevat tegemist ilmselge 
oksümoroniga: suveräänsus põhineb territoriaalsusel ning küberruum on mittemateriaalne 
ruum, mis põhineb suuresti elektromagnetspektril, mille ulatuses ei saa ükski riik piiritleda 
oma suveräänset ala. Seega arutles antud töö selle üle, kuidas suveräänsuse kontseptsiooni 
küberruumis rakendada. Varajased Interneti vabaduse eest seisnud aktivistid eesotsas David 
Posti, David Johnsoni ja John P. Barlow-ga nentisid, et riigid ei saa küberruumis suveräänsust 
teostada. Kuna see on suures osas mittemateriaalne, a-territoriaalne ning piirideta, ei olnud 
nende arvamuse kohaselt mõistlik allutada antud avatud ruum riikide võimule. Seega 
pakkusid liberaalsete vaadetega aktivistid välja, et küberruum peaks olema iseseisev ning 
isereguleeriv ruum, kus reeglid tekivad seda ruumi kasutavate inimeste vahel orgaaniliselt. 
Nende argumendid ei võtnud aga arvesse seda, et küberruum ei ole maailmast eraldiseisev 
ruum, vaid kommunikatsioonimeediana reaalse maailmaga tihedalt seotud.  
Kui riikide poolt täiesti reguleerimata ruumi käsitlus ei leidnud suurt poolehoidu, siis pakuti 
välja, et küberruumi puhul võiks olla tegemist globaalse ühisomandiga, sarnaselt õhu, 
avamere ja kosmosega. Globaalse ühisomandi puhul on tegemist ressursiga, mis ei kuulu 
otseselt ühegi riigi omandisse ega suveräänse kontrolli alla, vaid on jagatud hüve, mida 
hallatakse ühiselt läbi rahvusvaheliste lepingute. Võrreldes eksisteerivaid ühisomandeid 
küberruumiga, leidub siiski mitmeid erinevusi. Küberruum on inimeste poolt loodud ning 
seega mitte looduslikult tekkinud. Lisaks kasutab küberruum toimimiseks kõiki teisi 
ühisomandeid nagu avameri, kuhu on asetatud allveekaablid, ja õhk, mille kaudu signaalid 
levivad. Kogu küberruumi toetav füüsiline informatsiooni infrastruktuur on aga igal hetkel 
teatud riigi territooriumil ja selle riigi jurisdiktsiooni all. Samuti puuduvad küberruumil 
otsesed piirid, samal ajal kui näiteks avameri on oma ulatuses piiratud. Seega ei ole vähemalt 
praegusel hetkel küberruumi riikide poolt globaalse ühisomandina tunnustatud.  
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Globaalse ühisomandi argument aitas osati kaasa ka väärarvamuse tekkele, justkui ei oleks 
võimalik suveräänsust küberruumis teostada. Võttes arvesse küberruumi mittermateriaalset 
olemust ning a-territoriaalsust, saavad riigid siiski küberruumis suveräänsust teostada. Neil on 
jurisdiktsioon nende territooriumil asuva informatsiooni infrastruktuuri ning tegevuste üle, 
mis seda infrastruktuuri puudutavad. Lisaks saavad riigid reguleerida juurdepääsu oma 
territooriumile ning ka seda, mis nende territooriumilt välja läheb, läbi ligipääsupunktide, mis 
riiki globaalse võrguga ühendavad. Seega on küberruum territoriaalsem kui arvatud ning 
nendel riikidel, kes soovivad suveräänsust teostada, on see võimalus olemas. 
Eelnevale toetudes uuris antud töö, kuidas riigid suveräänsust küberruumis teostavad ja jõudis 
järeldusele, et seda tehakse mitmes vormis. Esiteks, teostavad riigid suveräänsust riigisiseselt 
infrastruktuuri osas, mis nende territooriumil asub. Osad riigid, näiteks USA, on antud 
küsimuses liberaalsemal positsioonil, keskendudes küberruumi avatud loomusele ning oma 
suveräänse haarde laiendamisele küberruumis. Vastanduval seisukohal on näiteks Venemaa ja 
Hiina, kes teostavad suveräänsust küberruumis kaitsepositsioonilt toetudes suveräänsuse 
kaitsele ning seega piiravalt. Teiseks, riigid teostavad suveräänsust küberturvalisusega seotud 
rahvusvahelise õiguse arendamise protsessides, otsustades aktiivselt, milliste kohustustega 
nad küberturvalisuse diskursuses seotud soovivad olla. Läbi osalemise ÜRO 
valitsusekspertide grupis või Shanghai Koostööorganisatsiooni töös edastavad riigid 
rahvusvahelisele kogukonnale oma seisukohti küberruumi reguleerimise osas. Samuti on üks 
suveräänsuse teostamise viise uue rahvusvahelise lepingu väljatöötamine. Kuigi enamik riike 
on uue lepingu, st täiendavate rahvusvaheliste kohustuste osas pigem negatiivselt meelestatud, 
on üleskutsed akadeemikute kui ka väikese hulga riikide poolt siiski aktuaalsed. Kui 
konsensust antud alal ei leita, võib rahvusvahelise lepingu idee muutuda taas relevantseks.  
Lisaks positiivsetele suveräänsuse teostamise viisidele, juhtis töö tähelepanu sellele, et riigid 
kasutavad tihti ära küberruumiga seostud anonüümsust ja globaalset haaret ning rikuvad 
madala intensiivsusega küberoperatsioone kasutades teadlikult teiste riikide suveräänsust. 
Saboteerides riigi kriitilist infrastruktuuri või muutes infoühiskonnana identifitseeriva riigi e-
teenused kasutamatuks teatud perioodiks, teeb ründav riik, teise riigi suveräänses ruumis ilma 
loata tegutsedes teadliku otsuse rahvusvahelist õigust rikkuda. Antud olukorda nimetab 
Stephen Krasner organiseeritud silmakirjalikkuseks: riigid rikuvad rahvusvahelist õigust, sest 
see on neile kasulik.  
Viimaks on oluline ka küsimus rahvusvahelise õiguse ning küberturvalisuse sümbioosist. 
Võttes arvesse tehnoloogia kiiret arengut, on rahvusvaheline õigus survestatud kahest eri 
suunast: tehnoloogia ise ning juhtivate riikide mõtlemine. Tehnoloogia areng paratamatult 
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soosib teatud riike. Senini on olnud esiotsas USA, kelle mõtlemine on rahvusvahelise õiguse 
arengut antud vallas oluliselt mõjutanud. Seega on eelispositsioon rahvusvahelise õiguse 
interpreteerimise ning arengu üle otsustamisel nendel riikidel, kellel vastav tehnoloogia juba 
on. Tuleviku perspektiivis on küsimus selles, mil määral uued tehnoloogiad olemasolevat 
õigust muudavad ning kellele ideoloogiast ning väärtussüsteemist antud muudatuste 
läbiviimine kantud on.  
Teisalt mõjutab rahvusvahelist õigust juhtivate riikide mõtlemine seda, millised lahendused 
tekkivatele probleemidele leitakse. Rahvusvaheline õigus on oma tuumas sügavalt seotud 
poliitikaga. Õigus, mis ei võta riikide ambitsioone ja püüdlusi arvesse, võib muutuda 
utoopiaks, mis ei võtaks arvesse eksisteerivat reaalsust. Teisalt liigne keskendumine 
poliitikale õõnestab rahvusvahelise õiguse normatiivsust. Üritades lepitada kahte poolt, on 
antud juhul küberturvalisuse vallas välja kujunenud kaks erinevat koolkonda. Esimene neist 
keskendub eksisteeriva õiguse kohaldamisele ja teine leiab, et muutunud olude efektiivseks 
reguleerimiseks on vaja luua uut ning spetsiifilist õigust või läbi rääkida uue rahvusvahelise 
lepingu vastuvõtmine. Mõlemal lahendusel on oma negatiivsed küljed. Eksisteeriva õiguse 
kohaldamine võib kinni jääda selle taha, et ei suudeta kokku leppida ühtses tõlgenduses või ei 
ole riigid nõus nn vana õigust uutele oludele kohaldama. Antud töö on seisukohal, et 
eksisteerivat õigust saab ja peab kohaldama küberruumile, kuid arvesse tuleb võtta uut 
tehnoloogiast sõltuvat tegelikkust. Põhilised rahvusvahelise õiguse normid on juba riikide 
poolt aktsepteeritud, kuid antud juhul on neid vaja uutes oludes tõlgendada nii, et need pakuks 
efektiivset kaitset ning reguleeriks riikide käitumist. Uue õiguse loomine või rahvusvahelise 
lepingu väljatöötamine võib osutuda ajamahukaks protsessiks, kus senini konsensust 
mitteleidnud küsimustes ei suudeta siiski lõpuni kokku leppida. Samuti võib uus nn 
spetsiaalne õigus panustada üldise rahvusvahelise õiguse edasisse fragmenteerumisse. Siiski 
ei saa nt rahvusvahelise lepingu loomise ideed täiel määral kõrvale heita, sest juhul, kui riigid 
ei suuda olemasoleva õiguse raames kokku leppida küberruumis kohalduvate reeglite osas, on 
just spetsiaalne lahendus see, mis võiks panustada oluliselt õigusselgusesse ning –kindlusesse. 
Ükskõik kumma lahenduse kasuks rahvusvaheline kogukond lõpuks otsustab, on selge, et 
arvesse tuleb võtta mõtlema koolkonna huvisid ning eesmärke. Kuna ükski rahvusvaheline 
lahendus ei ole osalejate rohkust arvesse võttes selline, mis suudaks kõigi huve parimal moel 
tagada, ei kao organiseeritud silmakirjalikkus rahvusvahelisest suveräänsuse diskussioonist. 
Alati on maailmas riike, kes ei järgi rahvusvahelise õiguse sätestatud reegleid. Samas ei ole 
antud õiguse eesmärgiks ei küberturvalisuse diskussioonis kui ka üldisemalt rahvusvahelise 
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õiguse diskursuses organiseeritud silmakirjalikkust kaotada, vaid tagada, et selline käitumine 
ei muutu riikidevahelises suhtluses normiks. 
Riikide suveräänsuse küsimus küberturvalisuse kontekstis ei jää viimaseks korraks, mil 
tehnoloogia suveräänsuse teostamise küsimuse alla seab. Iga järgneva arenguhüppega leiavad 
riigid viisi, kuidas tehnoloogiat oma huvide kaitseks või edendamiseks veelgi efektiivsemalt, 
läbitungivamalt ning sügavamalt ekspluateerida, jäädes ise sealjuures nähtamatuks, 
anonüümseks ning jälitamatuks. Võimu teostamine ei ole enam mõttekas relvade ja füüsilise 
vägivallaga, kui seda saab teha palju nähtamatumalt ning väiksemate kulutustega. Selles 
kontekstis on küsimus suveräänsusest ja selle teostamises küberruumis üha aktuaalsem. 
Rahvusvaheline õigus peaks pakkuma reaalseid lahendusi reaalsetele dilemmadele, mis 
küberruumiga kaasnevad. Seetõttu ei saa rahvusvaheline kogukond aktsepteerida 
fundamentaalsete küsimuste eiramist rahvusvahelise õiguse ja küberturvalisuse diskursuses. 
Sisuline diskussioon ja reaalsed tõlgendused eksisteerivast õigusest, mis võtavad arvesse uut 
tehnoloogiast sõltuvat reaalsust valmistavad meid ette veelgi intensiivsemaks 
tehnoloogiatulevikuks.  
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